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ABSTRACT
Theists and non-theists alike have generally taken absolute perfection to be a necessary
condition for worship-worthiness. Unless the object is absolutely perfect, it is often put,
the kinds of attitudes or actions constitutive of worship are unwarranted. In this thesis, I
offer an account of worship-worthiness that does not take for granted that to be worshipworthy is to be absolutely perfect. More specifically, I advance the claim that to be
absolutely perfect is to be supremely worship-worthy and that supreme worshipworthiness holds a unique position in this respect. For instance, I argue that to be
absolutely perfect and thus supremely worship-worthy is to be necessarily worshipworthy and uniquely worthy of an undivided worship. I arrive at this conclusion in a
somewhat circuitous fashion in that the argument is premised on thin metaphysical and
theological commitments so that the success of the argument is not contingent on
commitments unlikely to be shared by my interlocutors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between the concept of worship-worthiness and an
absolutely perfect being—that is, a being like God? Most basically, worship-worthiness
as a concept involves the task of delivering an explanation of the fittingness of an act of
worship. In virtue of what is a being worthy of worship? What is the basis in which an act
of worship is rendered choiceworthy? Accordingly, worship-worthiness ostensibly would
include facts about both the subject and the object of worship. Thinkers in the major
monotheisms have conventionally taken the absolute perfection of God—that is,
representatively, God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence—as the basis
of God’s worship-worthiness. Absolute perfection, on this account, is a fact about God
that delivers an explanation of the fittingness of all acts of worship directed to God. As
the guiding question of this project indicates, I am interested in exploring the nature of
this explanation of worship-worthiness.
Towards an Account of Worship-Worthiness
My interest in exploring the nature of this explanation of God’s worshipworthiness is, in part, because theists generally have gone further than to say absolute
perfection is a sufficient condition of worship-worthiness and taken it as a necessary and
sufficient condition. For instance, “perfection claims,” according to Brian Leftow, “have
roots in primary religious life. They arguably flow out of Western monotheist attitudes of
worship, for arguably to see God as anything less than absolutely perfect would make
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Him out not to deserve the sorts of attitudes Western monotheist worship involves."1
Absolute perfection of the object of worship, then, amounts to a strict requirement for
worship-worthiness whatever else the concept might entail.
Yujin Nagasawa has problematized the view that absolute perfection is a
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. In an essay titled “The Grounds of Worship”
and a series of response essays, Nagasawa and Tim Bayne challenge the notion that
God’s worship-worthiness can adequately be grounded in terms of what they coin the
maximal excellence account.2 The maximal excellence account construes God’s worship
worthiness much in the way I have described above—worship-worthiness supervenes on
the supreme degree of the intrinsic excellence of the divine nature. The challenges posed
are both direct and indirect. The challenges found in “The Grounds of Worship” are
indirect, considering that the objections are directed specifically at what they term the
“obligation thesis”—the thesis that persons are obligated to worship God. The reasons
they provide, then, purportedly show why persons are not obligated to worship God on
the bases traditionally given. This is relevant insofar as the objections to the obligation
thesis would count against what might be reasons of the right sort to worship God or
there are shared reasons to think one ought to worship God and that God’s worshipworthiness is related to the intrinsic value of God’s nature—though, the question of our
obligation to worship God and God’s worship-worthiness are conceptually distinct.3

1. Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11.
2. Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” Religious Studies 42 (2006): 299313.
3. I shall not be addressing the question of whether persons are obligated to worship God, though
it may be the case that if God’s worship-worthiness is related to his absolute perfection in the way typically
thought by Anselmian theists, then our relationship to this perfect being might entail such an obligation.
For what it is worth, St. Anselm himself thinks as much: “This is the kind of substance that is so pre-
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Perhaps the most substantive and direct of Nagasawa’s objections to the maximal
excellence account are found in the context of his broader project first defended in the
groundbreaking essay “A New Defense of Anselmian Theism” and developed further in
his recent monograph, Maximal God: A New Defense of Perfect Being Theism.4 The
Maximal God approach is a significantly altered approach to traditional perfect being
theism, leaving open as a matter of principle the possibility that whatever the greatest
metaphysically possible being is, it may not be what he terms “omni God.” Omni God is
the being that possesses the attributes of omnibenevolence, omniscience, and
omnipotence. The core of the perfect being thesis, he contends, is that God is the greatest
possible being—and while the greatest possible being may in fact be omni God, it could
also be the case that it is metaphysically impossible for a being to be omnibenevolent,
omniscient, and omnipotent due to any number of considerations such as the classical
formulation of the problem of evil or conflicts between these attributes. Should omni God
be impossible to exemplify, we ought to conclude then, not that God does not exist—or
that there is no perfect being—but that the perfect being is something that falls short
(however short is indeterminate) of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
Considering objections to his new defense of perfect being theism, Nagasawa
notes the possibility that the maximal God approach might entail that God is less
worship-worthy or not worthy of worship at all: “Few perfect being theists would be

eminently valuable that people have to worship it.” See “Monologion,” in Anselm of Canterbury: The
Major Works, eds. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 80.
4. Nagasawa, “A New Defence of Anselmian Theism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58, no. 233
(2008): 577-596; Nagasawa, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
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willing to accept the maximal God approach if it can entail that God is not
worshipworthy.”5 Nagasawa offers the following response to the objection. Suppose that
some X is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, but only nearly omniscient. Suppose X knows all
true propositions excluding one: P. However insignificant P is, says Nagasawa, God’s
worship-worthiness becomes contingent on his knowing or not knowing P. X moves from
not worship-worthy to worship-worthy as he comes to know P, and this is absurd.
Accordingly, for Nagasawa, it would not necessarily follow that if God is less than omniperfect, he is any less worthy of worship.
Even if the maximal excellence account is right, Nagasawa continues, he is
unconvinced that “the maximal degree of intrinsic excellence” must refer to the omniattributes rather than to the maximal consistent set of great-making properties.
Nagasawa’s approach to perfect being theism, then, poses a challenge to the notion that
the basis of God’s worship-worthiness is his perfection (traditionally conceived) insofar
as it in principle leaves open the possibility that there exists a worship-worthy being
whose worship-worthiness consists in some combination of attributes short of absolute
perfection. This nonstandard method in perfect being theology causes problems for any
account of worship-worthiness that takes absolute perfection to be a necessary condition.
Nagasawa’s work, including objections such as the ones mentioned above, has
catalyzed the attention given to worship as a subject of philosophical inquiry and in large
part has inspired this project. While many have responded to Nagasawa’s new defense of
perfect being theism more generally, few have responded directly to his work on worship.

5. Nagasawa, Maximal God, 104.
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This is due, in part, to the relatively little amount of attention that has been given to the
nature of worship in analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology.6
This is not to say that the concept of worship-worthiness has not received
substantive attention independently of Nagasawa’s prompting. Philosophers such as
Robert Adams, William Wainwright, Mark Murphy, Brian Leftow, Paul Moser, Mark
Wynn, Tom Morris, Richard Swinburne, Ninian Smart have reflected at varying lengths
and with respect to varying purposes on the relationship between our concept of God and
worship-worthiness.
More directly, Mark Murphy stands out from among these philosophers in that he
offers one of the most recent and developed accounts of worship-worthiness. In God’s
Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, Murphy responds to
the potential concern that the account he defends of the normative elements of divine
agency with respect to the problem of evil makes God out to be a being who is less than
worship-worthy.7 He thus spells out in a preliminary fashion what worship-worthiness
entails and why his account of God’s own ethics does not undermine God’s worshipworthiness.
According to Murphy, appropriate worship-worthiness relations presuppose and
are partially constituted by having particular beliefs about and attitudes toward a potential
object of worship. The appropriateness of such beliefs and attitudes finds its basis in what

6. There are a number of important exceptions. For instance, see Terrence Cuneo, Ritualized
Faith: Essays on the Philosophy of Liturgy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically: Philosophical Reflections on Religious Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
7. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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would be reasons of the right sort to worship God. The content of such beliefs and
attitudes ought to meet two conditions: “A being is worthy of worship by some person in
this sense only when there is a massive inequality between that being and that person and
the inequality is an inequality of a certain sort of value.”8 The value gap relation must be
of an “inescapable and overriding” kind—one that bears practical priority over other
kinds of value (instrumental, etc.). Similarly, the inequality condition is not one of mere
degrees of value. Rather, the inequality, again, is of a certain kind, one in which the sorts
of value are not even in competition with one another.
The preliminary account of worship-worthiness offered by Murphy and the work
of these other philosophers provides a variety of resources for sustained reflection on the
relationship between worship-worthiness and absolute perfection. Still, no one has of yet
developed and defended an extended account of worship-worthiness and consciously
factored in and reflected upon at length objections of the type levied by Nagasawa. Over
the course of this project, I intend to develop such an account.
Towards this end, I will make constructive use of Murphy’s preliminary account
of worship-worthiness in addition to the various contributions of other thinkers. To be
more specific, I will be taking from Murphy’s work what I consider to be the key
consideration for getting our minds around worship-worthiness—the notion of a massive
inequality in value between the subject and object of worship. Throughout this project, I
will be referring to this notion as the sufficient value inequality condition. Beyond this
appropriation of Murphy’s account, I will proceed with an original account of worshipworthiness and attempt to accommodate objections along the lines of Nagasawa’s.

8. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130.
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Accordingly, I will not be proceeding on the assumption that absolute perfection is a
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. Rather, I will argue for an account of
worship-worthiness that admits of degrees. On the account I will defend, the minimum
threshold of worship-worthiness—that is, the minimum distance between the subject and
object requisite for appropriate worship—is satisfied when the sufficient value inequality
condition is met. Once the minimum threshold is met, the worship-worthiness of a being
increases proportionately with the value of that being to the upper limit of worshipworthiness, which I will be referring to as supreme worship-worthiness (this term is also
Murphy’s). Absolute perfection, then, corresponds to supreme worship-worthiness.
Supreme worship-worthiness is the highest position on the scale of worship-worthiness.
Accordingly, the principal aim of this project is to advance a concept of supreme
worship-worthiness. Along these lines, I will be defending what I take to be two key
features of supreme worship-worthiness: 1) necessary worship-worthiness and 2) the
principle of undivided worship.
Approach
The nature of this accommodation to Nagasawa’s objection is somewhat
provisional or instrumental. Ultima facie, it may be the case absolute perfection is a
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. It would not be the case, on this account, that
worship-worthiness would admit of degrees or that the sufficient value inequality
condition could be satisfied by any being other than an absolutely perfect being. Over the
course of this project, however, I will forgo what I consider to be the necessary
metaphysical and theological commitments to make the case for absolute perfection as a
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. Rather, I will be proceeding on somewhat
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metaphysically deflationary account, minimizing the metaphysical commitments required
to get the argument off the ground as far as it is possible.
One way to think of this approach might be in the vein of a Wittgensteinian
ladder. Rather than arguing for the absolute uniqueness of supreme worship-worthiness
with thicker concepts of God or classical theistic metaphysical commitments (those of St.
Thomas Aquinas or St. Augustine, for instance), I will attempt to remain within the
thinner metaphysical world of my interlocutors and of analytic philosophy in general,
using its own procedures and resources and addressing their objections on their own
terms. I will concede the multivalence of worship-worthiness for the sake of argument
and then climb the ladder of multivalence (so to speak) up to supreme worshipworthiness, where I will then set the terms for what it may look like to toss the ladder. If
this approach is successful, I will effectively have placed us in the ballpark of an account
of supreme worship-worthiness. On this account, the supremely worship-worthy being is
unique insofar as (1) the supremely worship-worthy being is necessarily worship-worthy
and (2) to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being one must worship the
supremely worship-worthy being alone.
Chapter Outline
Over the course of this chapter, I hope to have clearly stated the guiding question
of this project and offered an explanation of what the question means. I have gestured at
who some of the most relevant figures in the discussion are and how I hope to proceed in
terms of my own account. In the second chapter I offer a defense and explanation of the
sufficient value inequality condition. Along these lines, I also make a number of relevant
qualifications, distinctions, and clarifications due to the relevantly underexplored nature
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of worship-worthiness in the literature. In the third chapter I build on the account
developed in the second chapter and offer a defense and explanation of what I take to be
two key elements of an account of supreme worship-worthiness: necessary worshipworthiness and the principle of undivided worship. In the concluding chapter I will offer
several reflections on the possible implications of this project as well as what difference
thicker concepts of God might make for an account of worship-worthiness.
Contribution to Scholarship
The aims of this project are relatively modest. I will not be attempting to establish
any strong obligation to worship the supremely worship-worthy being or requirement to
not worship any other being. I will not be attempting to establish that there are no
worship-worthy beings other than the supremely worship-worthy being. Rather, it is my
hope to advance the conversation in analytic philosophy and analytic theology on the
topic of worship and worship-worthiness. Contemporary uses of the concept of worshipworthiness have often taken for granted what the concept means and very few have
offered independent accounts of the concept. Thus I take the account I will offer here as a
novel contribution to the relatively new conversations surrounding worship-worthiness in
that I will not be proceeding on the assumption that worship-worthiness requires absolute
perfection.
Worship is one of the most central features of religion and perhaps the most
central component of religion in the day-to-day lives of committed religious persons. If
all that comes of this project is to bring more attention to the philosophical and
theological relevance of a philosophically underdeveloped issue, I shall consider this a
contribution, even if only a minimal one. Further, no one has of yet provided an account
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of worship-worthiness of this length, and it is my hope that this project will provide
helpful suggestions toward a constructive account and elicit further reflection on this
central issue.
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CHAPTER II
WORSHIP-WORTHINESS AND THE SUFFICIENT VALUE INEQUALITY
CONDITION
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an explanation and defense of the first half
of the dual threshold account of worship-worthiness. The first threshold—the minimum
threshold—is met when a being satisfies the sufficient value inequality condition and the
second threshold—the maximum threshold—is met when (having already satisfied the
minimum threshold) a being reaches absolute perfection. An absolutely perfect being is
that being that exhibits the core great-making properties to the intrinsic maxima of their
value. The sufficient value inequality condition is the key consideration for worshipworthiness. Loosely defined, the condition states that for a being to be worthy of worship,
the potentially worship-worthy being must be absurdly more valuable than any would-be
worshipper of that being. Thus over the course of this chapter I defend the sufficient
value inequality condition as key to understanding worship-worthiness at the minimum
threshold.
Getting our minds around worship-worthiness will require number of
clarifications and distinctions so that when I offer my own account, we will have all the
relevant concepts distilled down to the point that there are only as many pieces to fit
together as there are pieces needed to form an image and where the image will be clear
and accurate. Toward that end, in the first section I identify what I consider to be a
problematic move among some perfect being theologians who take worship-worthiness to
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be a useful criterion in perfect being theology. Identifying these problems will illuminate
the distinction between worship-worthiness and the sufficient greatness criterion in
perfect being theology. In the second section, I suggest that the most helpful way of
characterizing what kind of task it is to develop an account of worship-worthiness is in
terms of a “reasons of the right sort account” of normativity. Next, I offer something of a
provisional account of worship so that we have just enough of a working concept to get
us into the discussion of what it might mean to deserve worship. This leads into the next
section, where I identify a few existing accounts of worship-worthiness and attempt to
show the relative strengths and failures of each. Having identified the problems that arise
in the existing accounts of worship-worthiness, in the next section I proceed with an
account that avoids the issues I have identified along the way.
One possible way of advancing the claims of this project would be to appeal to
thicker concepts of God or of the grounding of value than are commonly in circulation in
analytic philosophy. As I mentioned in the introduction, I do not intend to proceed in this
way. Rather, I will be advancing the claims of this thesis on somewhat metaphysically
deflationary grounds, forgoing controversial metaphysical assumptions as far as it is
possible when addressing relevant problems that arise. In proceeding this way, I can
address the common objections to the claims I will be advancing on their own terms, so
to speak, so at to increase the likelihood that my responses will be convincing to those
who do not share my metaphysical commitments.
Worship-Worthiness and Perfect Being Theology
Developing an account of worship-worthiness is a distinct task from developing a
concept of God and thus moves according to its own procedures. Attending to this
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distinction is a helpful way to begin because it will give us a clearer view of the kinds of
considerations that are and are not relevant to the development of an account of worshipworthiness. Whether the concept of God intrinsically entails the concept of worshipworthiness—analytically or otherwise—is an interesting question. However, for the
purposes of this project, I will attempt to tease worship-worthiness apart from the concept
of God for the sake of becoming clearer about what we mean when we use the concept
and what the concept might entail apart from its association with the concept of God.
First, in many instances, the concept of worship-worthiness is employed in order
to deliver for us certain results about the divine nature where the content of “worshipworthiness” is assumed. Unless specific content can be given to the concept of worshipworthiness independently of the commitments 1) to be God is to be worthy of worship
and 2) to be worthy of worship is to be God, it is difficult to see the import of the concept
in delivering specific attributes of God. Second, conflating worship-worthiness with the
concept of God—more specifically, using worship-worthiness as some sort of sufficient
greatness criterion in perfect being theology—fundamentally characterizes the nature of
God in relation to creatures. This characterization is problematic for theism generally
insofar as we are committed to standard ways of conceiving of God’s sovereignty.
For these reasons, I intend to treat the issue of developing an account of worshipworthiness as distinct (though not wholly unrelated) from the task of perfect being
theology. Along these lines, I will not be using “worship-worthy being” and “God”
interchangeably. While I am committed to the view that God is worship-worthy, for the
purposes of this project, I will not be assuming that all would-be worship-worthy beings
are God. In fact, God’s worship-worthiness will only substantively be the topic of
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conversation in the next chapter—that is, worship-worthiness in the supreme case.
Throughout this chapter, when “God” is used in conversation with worship-worthiness, it
will be for one of two reasons: 1) the existing literature on worship-worthiness almost
exclusively discusses the nature of the concept in the context of God’s worshipworthiness and 2) interacting with the ways people talk about God’s worship-worthiness
is useful towards developing the more neutral account I defend in this chapter.
Consider an example from Katherine Roger’s Perfect Being Theology: “The
starting assumption, shared by the vast majority of westerners past and present, whether
theist or atheist, is that a being who is the source of all and a worthy object of worship
must be the most perfect being possible.”1 For Rogers, what would make a being “a
worthy object of worship” would make it the most perfect being possible. In the order of
operations of coming to know the divine nature, worship-worthiness is the more
fundamental property than perfection and is doing more of the conceptual work. At the
least, securing worship-worthiness is the motivating force behind securing perfection:
“We must define God as best as possible, otherwise we are imagining a finite being
woefully limited by our own imperfections and hence undeserving of our worship.”2
The intuitive appeal of this approach is clear. It may be that there is a certain kind
of unreserved and whole-hearted worship typically thought of by the devout as
appropriate to give only to a being than which we could not conceive of a greater. If there

1. Katherine Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), vii.
In another place, Rogers says “maximal perfection seems to entail maximal praise worthiness. If God is not
maximally praiseworthy, then we can conceive of a greater being, one who is maximally praiseworthy. See
Rogers, “Anselm on Praising a Necessarily Perfect Being,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 34 (1993): 41-52.
2. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology, 2.
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are two impressive beings but one significantly more so than the other, perhaps we ought
to direct our worship to the more impressive of the two. But if this is true and God is the
limiting case of worship-worthiness, then God must also be the limiting case of greatness.
Accordingly, we can take worship-worthiness as some sort of criterion in perfect being
theology. God has those properties that would make him worthy of worship. As a direct
example, Nelson Pike deduces a specific divine attribute in a case study following a
similar procedure:
(1) To worship x is to act as if one believes x to be conscious or aware.
(2) If x is not conscious or aware, then to act toward x as if one believes x to be
conscious or aware is to act in a way that is inappropriate and unfitting to x’s
nature.
(3) Therefore: If x is not conscious and aware, to worship x is to act toward x in a
way that is inappropriate and unfitting to x’s nature.
(4) If to worship x is to act in a way that is inappropriate and unfitting to xnature,
then x is not an appropriate or fitting object of worship. (This premise follows
from the fact that if x is an appropriate or fitting object of worship, then to
worship x is to act toward x in a way that is appropriate and fitting to x’s nature.)
(5) Therefore: If x is not conscious and aware, x is not an appropriate object of
worship. ‘x is worthy of worship’ entails ‘x is conscious and aware.’3
While worship-worthiness is already doing some heavy lifting here, Paul Moser goes
further. For Moser, not only is worship-worthiness a suitable criterion in perfect being
theology, it is in fact the only suitable criterion. Any argument about the existence of God
that does not also establish the existence of a worship-worthy being is to fail to
demonstrate anything about God: “Advocates of natural theology have the massive
burden of establishing via an argument limited to natural sources of evidence that a

3. Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 152-153.
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personal agent worthy of worship exists.”4 Inquiry into the divine nature, then, proceeds
along these lines, yielding such results as, “Something will be worthy of worship only if
it is morally without defect. Something (or, better, someone) will satisfy the title ‘God,’
then, only if that thing (or one) is morally perfect, and this perfection must be inherent
rather than borrowed.”5 Moser is unconvinced that arguments terminating in the existence
of some first cause or unmoved mover have any relevance for the existence or nature of
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Accordingly, Moser argues we can get
entailments from the nature of what it is to be worthy of worship to the nature of what it
is to be God:
Part of God’s will, if God is worthy of worship, would include unselfish love for
others, and direct acquaintance with such love would be de re…. If God is worthy
of worship, and hence morally perfect self-sufficiently, then God is in a
distinctive category relative to our familiar world.6
Satisfying a morally perfectionist title ‘God,’ a God worthy of worship would aim
to be relationally curative in probing towards humans. From the standpoint of
moral perfection and hence of worthiness of worship, God would be defective in
lacking a relationally curative aim and practice toward humans.7

4. Paul Moser, The Severity of God: Religion and Philosophy Reconceived (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 123. See also Paul Moser, The God Relationship: The Ethics for
Inquiry about the Divine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
5. Paul Moser, The Severity of God, 12-13.
6

Paul Moser, The God Relationship, 11-12.

7. Paul Moser, The God Relationship, 43. Daniel Hill has in common with Moser this notion that
the moral character of a being is the primary consideration for worship-worthiness. Among the various
attributes that make up divine greatness, “moral praiseworthiness is one of the most valuable lot.” “moral
praise worthiness forms a central part of the worship-worthiness of a divine being.” See Daniel Hill,
Divinity and Maximal Greatness (New York: Routledge, 2005), 215. See also, Charles Lewis, “Divine
Goodness and Worship Worthiness,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983): 143-58.
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In spite its intuitional appeal, the conflation of the two tasks results in a host of
issues. First, it is noteworthy that in cases such as Moser’s, there is rarely any real estate
dedicated to an actual exposition and defense of the concept of worship-worthiness.
There are certain prereflective intuitions about what worship-worthiness might entail
operating here, but for the most part the content of the concept—that is, what would
make a being worthy of worship—is assumed. Unless it can be shown that being worthy
of worship entails being “morally perfect self-sufficiently,” independently of the
assumption that to be worship-worthy just is to be whatever God is and God must be
morally perfect, it is not clear what import the concept has for developing a concept of
God. There is a redundancy to the procedure without an independent account of what
worship-worthiness entails. Without a filled-out and independent concept of worshipworthiness, the procedure has the potential just to yield the results the operator wishes the
procedure to yield.8
Additional problems with the above approach arise when we begin to fill out the
concept of worship-worthiness and become more specific about what we mean when we
employ the concept. Principally, worship-worthiness is fundamentally a relational notion.
Worship-worthiness is not an intrinsic property of any one being. Rather, worship-

8. Another more developed example might be Mark Wynn’s God and Goodness: A Natural
Theological Perspective, where he considers “how an examination of the nature of worship may furnish an
understanding of the concept of God.” Critiquing Swinburne’s concept of God, Wynn argues “if we are to
find Swinburne’s approach religiously adequate, we will want some reassurance that the God he portrays
remains sufficiently different from human beings to ensure that he is worthy of worship, although they are
not.” See God and Goodness (New York: Routledge, 1999), 142-46. Wynn offers something of a
preliminary account of worship-worthiness saying that worship is “a fitting response to God, not only
virtue of God’s metaphysical ultimacy, but also in virtue of his or her inherent goodness,” “as the
primordial expression of existence” and “the radiant attractiveness of God in himself or herself.” See 15568. I think there is something to these preliminary remarks. But the “metaphysical ultimacy” of God is
something that would require a great deal of unpacking; and in unpacking what metaphysical ultimacy
entails, it is hard to imagine one could do this without making the metaphysical commitments I have
decided to forgo.
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worthiness is a property that supervenes on the relation of two parties. To be worshipworthy is to be worthy of some agent’s worship. A being never appropriately worships
himself.9 The import of this feature of worship-worthiness in the case of using the
concept as a criterion in developing a concept of God is that God’s own nature becomes
essentially determined as God-in-relation-to some creature. God’s fundamental nature
becomes characterized in terms of something that is not God. As Mark Murphy points
out, not only is it an “anathema for the Anselmian, but a mistake in terms of theism
generally, to take God’s fundamental nature to be defined relationally, especially when it
seems possible that God might have never created.”10 While the concern to guarantee
God’s worship-worthiness is certainly an admirable enterprise, it is not clear that the
procedures above can be run without in one way or another obtaining its results at the
cost of other general concerns of perfect being theism regarding sovereignty.
An advocate of the worship-worthiness criterion in perfect being theology may
take issue with the characterization above. Perhaps there is a way to avoid a strong kind
of metaphysical characterization of God’s relation to creatures. That is, in employing
worship-worthiness as a kind of sufficient greatness criterion, the criterion does not entail
that God depends on creatures in any kind of way for God’s existence or nature. Nothing

9. Ninian Smart, The Concept of Worship (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1972), 2627; James Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” Religious Studies (1971): 331. There may be an initial
concern here about the christological implications of the claim that no person appropriately worships
himself. The man Jesus appears at times clearly to be worshipping the Father in the Gospels. This seems to
me to be a problem of the standard christological kind where there is pressure to affirm apparently
contradictory things about Christ’s divine and human nature. Christ is passible in his human nature but
impassible in his divine nature, for instance. I suspect that the standard ways to go about resolving these
tensions could be applied to the issue of the second person of the Trinity worshipping God the Father as the
God-man.
10. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 18.
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is true about God’s nature in se in virtue of some state of affairs other than God’s nature.
Maybe the heart of the procedure is epistemic—that is, perhaps worship-worthiness
provides an epistemic way into the divine nature. Creatures can come to know certain
things about God through the use of this criterion without saying that God is dependent in
some way on creatures. This is not enough to get us out of trouble.
Getting more specific about the fundamentally relational feature of worshipworthiness raises a related problem. Take, for example, my suggestion that the key
feature of a worship-worthiness relation is the value inequality condition. The conflation
of the concept of worship-worthiness with the concept of God—that is, characterizing the
nature of God in relation to creatures—runs the risk of limiting the excellence of God in
our conceptualization to the kinds of creatures that exist in the world. If worshipworthiness serves as some kind of criterion of sufficient greatness for God, then God only
needs to be as great as to meet the minimum threshold to be worthy of worship by
existing creatures in the actual world. If there is any truth to the value inequality
condition, then the value inequality condition means that the greatness of God becomes
variable on the greatness of the creatures that exist. Had there existed creatures much
more impressive than humans, using worship-worthiness as a criterion of sufficient
greatness would raise the bar, so to speak, necessary for God to be great enough to be
God. God would be a much more impressive being in this world than in a world where
humans are the most impressive creatures. With this understanding of worshipworthiness, the minimum level of greatness requisite for worship-worthiness just is the
level of God’s greatness. Consequently, in our conceptualization, God ends up being a
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less impressive being in this world than he would have to be if there existed more
impressive creatures.11
Consider a final reason against configuring worship-worthiness as some kind of
sufficient greatness criterion in perfect being theology. If perfect being theology and
developing an account of worship-worthiness share one and the same task—establishing
the existence of God and/or some set of divine attributes—then those who would set
themselves to the worship-worthiness task inherit the challenges commonly faced by
perfect being theologians. It would be a reason in favor of any account of worshipworthiness, then, if from step one it separates itself from these issues before facing the
kinds of problems that might arise that are unique to its own task.
Reasons for Action
How ought we then to characterize the task of developing an account of worshipworthiness? A useful way of circumscribing worship-worthiness is in terms of a
judgment made by a worshipper concerning what the worshipper has good reason to do
given certain beliefs and attitudes about a potential object of worship. Constitutive of
worship-worthiness, then, is the worshipper’s possessing reasons of the right sort to
worship. “Reasons of the right sort” is a popular topic of conversation among those
writing on the nature of normativity. I have no one explanation to offer of what exactly
reasons of the right sort account of normativity means or all it might entail, but Mark

11. The objector might reply: It seems, then, that absolute perfection is the only non-arbitrary
threshold high enough to guarantee God’s worship-worthiness by all creatures other than God regardless of
how impressive they are. This may well be the case. But necessary worship-worthiness is not what is under
discussion at the moment. And this is only a problem for the distinction I am making if the only kind of
worship-worthiness is necessary worship-worthiness. This too, ultima facie, may be the case. But as I have
stated in the introduction, I have decided to forego the kinds of metaphysical and ontological commitments
that would be required to make this case, say, if there existed an ontologically simple being, for example.
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Murphy’s illustration is helpful towards understanding the relevance of this concept in
the case of worship-worthiness:
If a powerful person can credibly threaten me with all sorts of terrible evils if I do
not worship him, that does give me reason to worship him: the reason to avoid
these terrible evils. (Of course, I should not worship him. But that there are
reasons to do so is obvious from the fact that there is some point to my
worshipping him, that you would not find unmotivated and unintelligible.) But the
presence of these reasons does not contribute to making this threatener worthy of
worship.12
This suggests, as William Wainwright does, that normatively, “‘being a logically
appropriate object of worship’ and ‘deserving worship’ are each built into the concept of
worship.”13 Nelson Pike illustrates this distinction with an analogy:
If I were to propose marriage to the Mona Lisa, I would be acting inappropriately
with respect to this object. The Mona Lisa is not (what might be called) a
logically appropriate object of the emotions and appetites expressed by this
action. The action would reveal that I had made a factual mistake about the
features of the Mona Lisa or that I was suffering from a pathological condition
akin to phobia. But now let’s suppose that I propose marriage to Mrs. Jones who
is happily married to Mr. Jones. Here my action would not be logically
inappropriate, though it might be morally or socially improper.14
In Murphy’s illustration, the threats of the powerful person make him a logically
appropriate object of worship in some sense even if the threats fail to make him deserving
of worship objectively speaking or in the mind of the one threatened.
Moreover, a reason to worship does not become a reason of the right sort simply
in virtue of that reason’s being characterized by the feature that the worshipper believes
the object deserves worship. Devil worshippers take Satan to be both a logically

12. Mark Murphy, Gods Own Ethics, 129-31.
13. William Wainwright, “Two (or Maybe One and a Half) Cheers for Perfect Being Theism,”
Philo 12, no. 2 (2009): 230. See also William Wainwright, “Assessing Ontological Arguments,” European
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2012): 19-39.
14. Pike, God and Timelessness, 156.
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appropriate object of worship and deserving of worship. While Satan would qualify as a
logically appropriate object of worship, it is hard to imagine any one account of worshipworthiness could accommodate both the kinds of reasons devil worshippers would take
Satan to be worship-worthy and the kinds of reasons theists generally take God to be
worship-worthy. The devil and God are such fundamentally different beings that reasons
of the right sort to worship one would have to disqualify the reasons of the other as being
of the right sort.15
Along these lines, the task of developing an account of worship-worthiness is to
develop an account of reasons of the right sort to worship a being. What constitutes the
choiceworthiness of an act of worship? What considerations count in favor of an act of
worship? What makes an act of worship an act worth performing?16 Importantly,
characterizing worship-worthiness in this way is to frame the issue in terms of justifying
reasons for worship rather than requiring reasons. A justifying reason, loosely, is a reason
in virtue of which an action becomes a reasonable or permissible thing to do. A requiring
reason, loosely, is a reason in virtue of which not performing a given action is
unreasonable or impermissible. The question of whether worshipping some being is
permissible given the nature of the relationship between the worshipper and the would-be

15. This is not to say that the respective reasons would share no features in common. For example,
both the devil worshipper and the worshipper of God might take one reason the object of their worship is
worship-worthy to be that they are powerful. But the differences in reasons would far outweigh the features
in common. If power were the only consideration for worship-worthiness, either both parties would have to
grant that both God and the devil are worship-worthy or would have to argue that one’s power is a different
kind than the other. Given that neither party is likely to do the former, in following the latter the
differentiation between the beings would reveal other mutually exclusive values (for example, theists might
qualify the value of God’s power in virtue of God’s goodness, while the devil worshipper would not make
the parallel move).
16. Mark Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 9.
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worship-worthy being is distinct from the question of whether this relation, all things
considered, might make not worshipping a being impermissible. The aim of this project is
to lay out the conditions under which the former relation might obtain.
Worship, Allegiance, and Total Devotion
In order to have some semblance of what might count as reasons of the right sort
to worship, some attention must be given to the question of what it means to worship.
Towards that end, in the present section I will offer a somewhat thin or provisional view
of worship. Accordingly, I identify the main features of worship and attempt not to
commit myself to any one controversial or thick view about the nature of the concept. A
thin concept of worship will be sufficient to get an account of worship-worthiness up and
running. To identify these main features, it will be helpful to place worship aside other
concepts often related to, associated with, or commonly thought to be entailed by the
concept. This way, I can point out important similarities and differences between these
concepts. Most basically, I take worship to be the appropriate response to a certain kind
of value. This response includes communicating in one way or another, however directly
or indirectly, the superiority of the object of worship and relative inferiority or
nothingness of the worshipper. This puts expressive action at the heart of worship.
Still, worship is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. Murphy sums up
what we are talking about at the most basic level when we employ the concept: “Worship
is a phenomenon involving beliefs, attitudes, and actions. To worship some being
presupposes and is partially constituted by having a set of beliefs and attitudes towards
that being. The actions that worship involves are actions that express, in more or less
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direct ways, those beliefs and attitudes.” 17 The difficulty in pinning down the concept
comes in when we attempt to set a range of which beliefs, attitudes, and actions can
properly be considered constitutive of worship.
Given the ambiguity of the concept, it is no surprise that worship can become a
catch-all term for all kinds of diverse religious, aesthetic, or even ethical attitudes and
behaviors. I take worship to be fundamentally a response to certain sort of value. But
what is the range of appropriate responses to that value and what kind of value do we
mean? Is worship an attitude consisting of a combination of attitudes often associated
with worship (gratitude, love, reverence, fear, awe, respect, admiration) or is worship sui
generis? For instance, Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa note that “canonical instances of
worship appear to involve moral, affective, aesthetic, and numinal attitudes,”18 and in
“many religious traditions worship is also taken to involve more straightforward
emotional attitudes, such as love.”19
James Rachels argues that, given the kind of thing worship is, there cannot even
in principle be a worship-worthy being: “in admitting that a being is worthy of worship
we would be recognizing him as having an unqualified claim on our obedience.”20 The
unqualified nature of the demand on our obedience is problematic for Rachels because it
requires a certain surrendering of our moral agency: “What we have, then, is a conflict
between the role of worshipper, which by its very nature commits one to total

17. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130.
18. Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa, “Grounds of Worship,” 301.
19. Bayne and Nagasawa, “Grounds of Worship,” 300.
20. Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” 334.
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subservience to God, and the role of moral agent, which necessarily involves autonomous
decision-making.”21 There is an overriding character of the obedience that follows from
our recognition of a worship-worthy being that compromises the very heart of what it
means to make moral decisions. At any point where our commitment to obedience comes
into conflict with other moral obligations, the commitment that follows on any
recognition of a worship-worthy being takes precedence over competing commitments.
Scott Aikin expresses the same sentiment:
For any rational moral agent (A), if A worships x, A’s worship of x is the joint
performance of three acts:
a. A is unconditionally obedient to x and to the demands that x’s existence
and properties place on A,
b. A views x as absolutely worthy of worship, and
c. A performs rituals or communicates acts expressing 3a and 3b.22
For Aikin, any kind of expressive act of worship entails also that the whole of the
worshipper’s life is owed to God. Aikin concedes that the concept of worship deserves
further examination: “Does worship require obedience? If it requires obedience, does it
require complete obedience? My answers have been affirmative, but I may be wrong.
Worship may be purely expressive and nothing more.”23
Rachels’ and Aikin’s construal of worship, wrong or right, at the least is not ad
hoc. Their understanding of worship shares several features with accounts generally
offered by theists. On the notion that worship entails obedience, here is Moser:
Characteristically, worship involves not only adoration and submission but also a
welcoming commitment to the perfect goodness and authority of the recipient of
worship. Worthiness of worship, as many people understand it, requires of a
21. Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” 335.
22. Scott Aikin, “The Problem of Worship,” Think 9, no. 25 (2010): 3.
23. Scott Aikin, “The Problem of Worship,” 11.

25

recipient of worship the worthiness of a person’s commitment to, or trust in, the
perfect goodness and authority of that recipient.24
Worship, then, not uncommonly, is understood to entail this rather strict obligation to
recognize the authority any being who is worthy of worship would have over the
worshipper.
But is it the case that worship is necessarily an obedience-entailing concept? It
may be possible that objections of the kinds levied by Rachels and Aikin and the
description of worship by theists such as Moser place too great a conceptual burden on
worship. This is relevant for our purposes insofar as the difference between an obedienceentailing and a nonobedience-entailing concept of worship seems to entail a weaker and a
stronger concept of worship-worthiness. And it may be the case that a stronger concept of
worship-worthiness would require additional criteria over the weaker one.
Perhaps Moser, Rachels, and Aikin have in mind more the notion of what Robert
Adams calls total devotion. Total devotion is transparent as to its obedience-entailing
quality: “Religious devotion is more than wholeheartedness or unconflicted enthusiasm.
It is supposed to occupy a person’s life so fully that nothing is left outside the realm in
which it reigns.”25 The significance of this definition is that total devotion includes
worship alongside other concepts such as obedience, wholeheartedness, trust, and love.
Could it be the case that a being could be worthy of our worship but not our total
devotion?

24. Moser, The Severity of God, 12.
25. Robert Adams, “The Problem of Total Devotion” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral
Commitment: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William Wainwright (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1896), 170.
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Aquinas, for example, argues that worship is an act included within the broader
virtue of religion, where the good of religion consists in rendering the honor due to God.
Along with worship, however, are other acts Aquinas considers distinct from worship,
even if belonging to the same grouping of actions under the good of religion:
Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to
pray, to sacrifice and many such like…. By the one same act man both serves and
worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is
due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under
an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed
to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and
to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by
assuming something Divine.26
It is the all-encompassing nature of concepts such as total devotion of Aquinas’ notion of
religion that create problems for theists who take total devotion to be the required
disposition to take towards God because of its alleged conflict with our autonomy in
moral decision making. But the problems presented are problems for worship only
insofar as worship as a concept intrinsically entails a total devotion characteristic of more
comprehensive concepts such as Aquinas’ understanding of religion.27

26. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 81, a. 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (London: Benzinger Brothers Inc., 1920), http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3081.htm. It is
difficult to say whether in Aquinas’ treatise on religion he treats worship as an obedience-entailing concept.
We see here that he at least treats them as acts performed with respect to different aspects; that is, worship
is the proper response to God with respect to its end of valuing the divine excellence and service the proper
response with respect to “his condition” as one subject to God. To bear witness to the Divine excellence
can be teased apart—at least conceptually—from bearing witness to our subjection to God. To take
Aquinas’ view on religion and justice as a whole, I am not sure that we can get a view of out Aquinas that
says it is possible for a being to be worthy of our worship but not of our obedience on those grounds, even
if only because any worship-worthy being would also satisfy the necessary conditions of authority
whatever they might be. For a thorough treatment of Aquinas’ notion of worship, see Robert Staudt,
Religion as a Virtue: Thomas Aquinas on Worship Through Justice, Law, and Charity (PhD diss., Ave
Maria University, Ave Maria, FL, 2008).
27. While it is outside the scope of this project to take up this issue, I would not be willing to
concede that the more wholistic concepts such as total devotion cause the problems Rachels and Aikin
think it does.
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Murphy argues, pace Moser, Aiken, and Rachels, that there is a relevant
distinction between worship-worthiness and what he terms allegiance-worthiness.
Consider what it means for some agent to have authority over another person. On one
prevailing account, for some X to have authority over Y is for X’s dictates to be related in
some way to Y’s reasons for action. One aspect of this relation is control. By control,
Murphy means, in part, that X’s dictates are constitutive of Y’s reasons for action. X’s
command “actualizes a state of affairs that is itself part of the reason for action”28 for Y—
“The content of the dictate and what the dictate actualizes a reason to do must be
identical; and the dictates must be themselves parts of the reasons for action
actualized.”29 These reasons are decisive, meaning, “R is a decisive reason for A to φ just
in case R is a reason that makes φ-ing ultima facie reasonable for A and not φ-ing ultima
facie unreasonable for A…. In the absence of defeating conditions, the authoritative
party’s commands decisively determine what the other ought to do in that domain.”30
Thus for Murphy, to say that a being such as God has authority over creatures is
for “God’s commands that created rational beings φ constitutively actualize decisive
reasons for created relational beings to φ.”31 But on Murphy’s account, the attributes that
make up absolute perfection are not sufficient for an absolutely perfect being’s
commands to constitutively actualize decisive reasons for rational creatures.
The Anselmian being’s omnipotence entails that the Anselmian being stands in a
causal relationship to creaturely agency, such that the Anselmian being can
control the circumstances of creaturely agency at will, but it does not suggest that
28. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 11.
29. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 13.
30. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 14.
31. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 16.
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the Anselmian being stands in a certain normative relationship to creatures, that
is, that the Anselmian being’s say-so always completes a reason for action of the
relevant content. The Anselmian being’s omniscience entails that the Anselmian
being will be aware of the stock of creaturely reasons, but not that that being will
be able to add to that stock by issuing directives. The Anselmian being’s (alleged)
perfect moral goodness may tell us something about what the stock of reasons is
or how we may act on them, but, again, gives no basis for thinking that the
Anselmian being can add to that stock of reasons by that being’s say-so.32
Neither is practical authority a perfection like omniscience or omnipotence are.
First, given that the existence of rational creatures is contingent, one cannot say
that it is constitutive of this perfection that the Anselmian being is actually
authoritative over anyone…. But, suppose we say that this perfection is just to be
understood counterfactually: the perfection is being such that if there were any
rational creatures, then the Anselmian being would be authoritative over them.
This would still be problematic, for it would seem that any such counterfactually
characterized feature of the Anselmian being would be grounded in categorical
features of that being. But, as I have claimed, there are no good arguments from
such categorical perfections to the Anselmian being’s bearing authority over
whatever rational creatures may exist.33
Thus widespread as it is, it appears the notion that worship-worthiness is allegianceworthiness-entailing is not without its own substantive difficulties
If it is possible to move forward with an account of worship-worthiness without
having to commit myself either to the view that worship is an obedience-entailing
concept or that worship is not an obedience-entailing concept, I will do so because of the
complexity of the conversations surrounding the issue of authority generally and divine
authority in particular (a question which in itself could occupy one’s attention well
beyond the scope of this project). On one hand, it seems that if worship is an obedience
or total-devotion entailing concept, then worship-worthiness turns out to be a much

32. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 140. Murphy offers a chapter-length defense of these abbreviated
arguments in An Essay on Divine Authority, 46-69.
33. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 140-41.
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stronger concept than if it were not an obedience-entailing concept and thus the worshipworthiness judgment requires stronger grounding. Perhaps there is no rough-and-ready or
functioning concept of worship sufficiently vague so as to please both groups.
Perhaps, on the other hand, there is some room to remain non-committal for the
purposes of this project, given that the best defenses of both the stronger and the weaker
notions of worship-worthiness appeal to the same grounding for their positions, only the
stronger notion, so to speak, gets more mileage out of the one grounding. That is, both the
obedience-entailing and the non-obedience-entailing concepts of worship take worshipworthiness to be grounded in the relative value of the worship-worthy being in
comparison to non-worship-worthy beings (even if the weaker notion would require
additional grounds for the authority-obedience relation to obtain).
Rather than place myself firmly on one side or the other, I will be proceeding on
the assumption that I can remain non-committal with respect to the issue of the
relationship between worship and total devotion. Perhaps we can place the differences
between these accounts of worship in a stronger and a weaker notion of the obedience
that the value differential condition can ground. In this case, in the instance of the upperlimit of worship-worthiness, the beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, and desires of one who
truly recognizes the absolute greatness of the object of worship are strong enough that the
range of kinds of actions that would adequately express these beliefs, attitudes,
dispositions, and desires would amount to a submission of oneself to the governance of
this supremely worship-worthy being. This would be the weaker notion of the obedience
in that it is characterized by a condition. If one adequately responds to the value of the
supremely worship-worthy being, then one will place oneself under the authority of this
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being and would be doing something unreasonable or altogether incompatible with one’s
other beliefs and attitudes if one did not, given the strength of these beliefs and
attitudes.34 The stronger of the notions of obedience thought to be grounded in the value
differential condition is to say that necessarily all rational beings stand in this relation to
the supremely worship-worthy being, that is, normatively speaking, are under its
authority regardless of what other reasons one may or may not have. The difference
between the two accounts, then, is between a contingently obedience-entailing and a
necessarily obedience-entailing concept of worship in the case of supreme worshipworthiness. Maybe this is a difference both sides would be content to solve another day
as a second order issue in worship-worthiness.35
From this point, we can ask certain questions about how direct the connection
between our actions and the intention to worship needs to be for an action to properly be
considered an act of worship. Many have noted the kinds of actions typically associated
with worship in the most direct or ritual sense such as bending the knee, bowing, or
offering sacrifices—actions that it one way or another directly (however symbolically)
communicate the superiority of the worshipped.36 Others note, as Richard Swinburne
does, “Many different acts constitute worship according to their context—taking off

34. This is based on a similar formulation made by Murphy in a chapter on divine authority and
divine perfection in An Essay on Divine Authority, 136-37.
35. I do not have sufficient time or space to allow the obedience-entailing or non-obedienceentailing quality of worship to be an additional variable in the mix. Nor do I want to hang the success of my
project on taking the right side of a controversial debate about the nature of divine authority.
36. Peter Appleby, “On Religious Attitudes,” Religious Studies no. 6 (1970): 359; J. N. Findlay,
“Can God’s Existence Be Disproved?” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, eds. Anthony Flew and
Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), 49; Smart, 26.
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shoes, singing, dancing, saying certain things, etc.”37 The context of the action has some
bearing on the scope of the kinds of actions that might be considered an act of worship.
One need not be in a church or synagogue to perform worshipful actions properly
speaking. These actions are actions that in one way or another express, however directly
or indirectly, the relevant beliefs and attitudes about the object of worship. The breadth of
the scope of the kinds of actions that can properly be considered worship is, in my
thinking, a live question. I will return to this issue and its relevance for developing an
account of supreme worship-worthiness in the next chapter.
Existing Accounts of Worship-Worthiness
If it is the case, however, that “deserving worship” is built into the concept of
worship, it may be that we cannot arrive at a tolerable concept of worship before diving
into worship-worthiness. In this sense, maybe there is some extent to which one must
learn to swim by jumping into the pool. Accordingly, in the next section I will explore
what I take to be the more compelling of the available accounts of worship-worthiness.
Interacting with these accounts will provide opportunities to reflect on what is helpful
and what is not, what works and what does not. Identifying the problems that arise in the
existing accounts of worship-worthiness will allow me to address them in turn as I
provide my own account in the following section.
While there has been little attention given to the actual content of the concept of
worship-worthiness in the literature, there has been a handful of noteworthy attempts.
Each of the accounts I will address can be loosely categorized into three main kinds—

37. Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 293.
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creation-based accounts, salvation-based accounts, and maximal excellence accounts.38
Many such accounts present reasons as to why persons are obligated to worship God. I
will set aside the issue of whether these reasons are sufficient to ground an obligation and
treat them simply as reasons that may or may not qualify as reasons of the right sort to
worship a being.
In Faith and Reason, Swinburne briefly offers reasons for worship representative
of the creation-based accounts.39
If there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and issued commands to
men, men have moral obligations which they would not otherwise have. The
grounds for this are as follows. Men ought to acknowledge other persons with
whom they come into contact, not just ignore them—and this surely becomes a
duty when those persons are our benefactors. We acknowledge people in various
ways when we meet them, e.g. by shaking hands or smiling at them, and the way
in which we acknowledge their presence reflects our recognition of the sort of
individual they are and the kind of relation they have to us. Worship is the only
response appropriate to God, the source of all being.40
Swinburne here characterizes God’s worship-worthiness as a kind of expression of
respect and gratitude to a benefactor. We owe worship to God as the one on whom we
depend for our existence. God’s unique position as creator ex nihilo means that the kind
38 Bayne and Nagasawa list brute fact accounts and prudential-reasons accounts alongside these
three but I am not aware of anyone who defends these accounts with any seriousness. The brute fact
account, according to Bayne and Nagasawa, holds that worship-worthiness is simply a brute property of
God, a property that cannot be explained in virtue of some other fact about God. Murphy’s response to the
notion that perhaps divine authority is a perfection could equally be applied in this case. The prudentialreasons account maintains that worshipping God might be in our best interest, either because failing to
worship God would be punishable by damnation or, more charitably, because God has created us such that
it would be useful to us to worship him. It is hard to see that groundless worship or any reason for worship
characterized by self-interest could be a reason of the right sort. With Bayne and Nagasawa I dismiss these
accounts as serious candidates for their lack of philosophical appeal and will not address them here, given
their lack of representation in the literature. See “Grounds of Worship,” 299-313. Elsewhere Nagasawa and
Campbell Brown entertain the divine-command account of worship-worthiness and find it lacking. See “I
Can’t Make You Worship Me,” Ratio 18 (2006): 139-43.
39. Though Swinburne’s account as a whole might be considered a kind of hybrid between the
creation and maximal excellence accounts.
40. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 79.
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of respect owed to God is of a peculiar kind, even if it shares certain features with the
respect we owe to other benefactors. This unique sort of respect—worship—is the kind of
respect to be given solely to our ultimate benefactor. Whatever respect we might owe to
others on whom we depend, they depend equally on God for their existence.
Crowe offers reasons representative of what he calls a “redemption-based”
account: “The basic thought is that, since God has performed acts of incalculable benefit
for humanity, human beings are therefore obliged to render God His due as far as they are
capable by worshipping Him.”41 Crowe lists the Christian belief in the incarnation of the
second person of the Trinity and the atonement as acts that would ground an obligation to
worship God. We are ultimately benefitted by these acts and worship is the only
appropriate response as those indebted to a being who has rescued us from the
misfortunes of the human condition.
The creation and salvation-based accounts are subject to considerable criticisms.
Concerning creation-based accounts, it is difficult to determine what precisely it means to
say we are benefited by our having been created. Aside from certain controversial
metaphysical theses—say, Aquinas’ view that being is goodness—it is not clear what
sense it makes to compare the pros and cons of existence to that of nonexistence. There
was no subject to attribute benefits or disadvantages to before our being created.42
Granting, even, that it is sensible to say we are benefited by our having been created, it
remains unclear whether the essence of worship is to respond to someone as to a

41. Benjamin Crow, “Reasons for Worship: A Response to Bayne and Nagasawa,” Religious
Studies 43 (2007): 470.
42. This is a similar critique to that of Nagasawa and Bayne in “Grounds of Worship,” 305.
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benefactor. This response seems more akin to attitudes such as gratitude or perhaps in the
more dramatic cases, a kind of indebtedness. Unless worship is reducible to attitudes such
as gratefulness, creation-based accounts fail to offer a sufficient explanation for worshipworthiness.
Salvation based accounts face the difficulty of explaining why worship would be
an appropriate attitude to take towards a being prior to any saving act on our behalf. The
fall of humankind is often characterized as a kind of failure to worship God rightly. If this
is the case, then God’s worship-worthiness is logically prior to his having saved us.43 If
there had never been a fallen human nature in need of saving, what then would be the
basis of God’s worship-worthiness? Additionally, like creation-based accounts, it seems
that the kinds of attitudes appropriate in response to God’s saving acts are more akin to
love and gratitude. Unless love and gratitude adequately capture the essence of what it is
to worship a being, salvation-based accounts fail in the same way creation-based
accounts do.
An objector might reasonably ask whether an account of worship-worthiness that
consciously excludes any salvation-based elements renders the seemingly
counterintuitive result that the acts of salvation are not praiseworthy, strictly speaking.
The intuitive appeal of this objection notwithstanding, granting a kind of worshipworthiness property to any of God’s saving actions results in what I take to be far more
counterintuitive results—results that those who would pose the objection would equally
want to deny. Here is one way to think about it. Christian theists generally take as a

43. Bayne and Nagasawa, “Worship-Worthiness Again: A Reply to Crowe,” Religious Studies 43
(2007): 479.
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matter of revealed truth that God is maximally worship-worthy—that is, God is that being
than which there could be no more worship-worthy. Either it is or is not the case that God
is maximally worship-worthy just in virtue of our standing in a certain relation to him in
terms of his own nature. If God’s actions are worship-worthy in any strong sense, this
mean that in acting to save us God becomes more worship-worthy than he would have
been if he had not. We would be required to say that God is not maximally worshipworthy without acting to save us because there was, so to speak, still room to grow. But
this is contrary to other commitments theists generally hold concerning God’s
sovereignty and the creature-independent basis of God’s value. God does not increase in
value in creating the world or in saving his creation because counterfactually, God would
have to be less valuable if he had not, and this is unacceptable.44 I will address the
creature-independent basis of God’s worship-worthiness in more detail later in this
chapter. Suffice for the moment to say that any account that would characterize the basis
of God’s worship-worthiness in terms of a kind of instrumental or value-for-us account is
suspect.

44. A similar case could be made against the creation-based accounts. In The Divine Attributes,
Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz argue that “maximal greatness relates to an entity’s worthiness for
worship and moral admiration” and that “God’s core attributes together entail that he is most worthy of
worship and admiration.” They also argue, however, that “all other things being equal, an entity which
intentionally creates good is greater than an entity which does not.” See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, The
Divine Attributes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 18-20. It cannot be both that God’s core attributes make him
most worthy of worship and that in creating God becomes greater than he would be if he did not create
(unless creation amounts to a core attribute that would entail some kind of panentheism).
However, in an attempt to do justice to the intuition that worshipping God because of the saving
work in Christ or because he is our creator is a supremely fitting thing to do, perhaps we could characterize
the worship-worthiness of these acts as reducible to or expressions of the essential divine attributes such as
divine freedom, generosity, power, and knowledge. To worship God in virtue of his saving or creating acts,
then, would be really to worship God because of these properties. Either way, I am content to characterize
the kinds of fitting responses to God’s saving and creating work as gratitude, love, and obedience.
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The most promising of the existing accounts of worship-worthiness is the
maximal excellence account. The promise of the maximal excellence accounts lies in,
among other things, its avoidance of the issues common to the relational-based accounts
like the creation and salvation-based accounts above. Robert Adams characterizes the
maximal excellence account as the recognition “not just of God’s benefits to us, but of
[God’s] supreme degree of intrinsic excellence.”45 The basic idea is that God possesses
great-making properties such as knowledge, power, and goodness to the intrinsic maxima
of their value and to worship just is to perform actions that express beliefs to the effect
that God is supremely valuable. Worship-worthiness is a property that supervenes on the
relation of our natures to God’s absolutely perfect nature. No value could be added to
God’s nature by a relation to creatures.
The maximal excellence account is not without its own problems. Recall
Nagasawa’s objection to this account from the introduction:
Suppose that X is nearly omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, but not
quite. Assume that X is omnipotent and omnibenevolent but only nearly
omniscient insofar as there is one true proposition that it does not know: p. If the
maximal excellence account is correct and the phrase ‘maximal degree of intrinsic
excellence’ presupposes omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, then
whether or not X knows p, however trivial that proposition is, determines whether
or not X is worthy of worship. As soon as X comes to know p, X suddenly
becomes worthy of worship, which seems absurd.46
Ed Wierenga addresses this objection head on:
I think this example is impossible and thus that it fails to establish an objection. It
is impossible because it requires that there be a being S, a proposition p, and a
world W, such that in W, p is true, S does not know p, and yet for every truth q
other than p, S knows q. Thus, S would know propositions as, Anyone who fails to
45. Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 14.
46. Yujin Nagasawa, Maximal God, 104.
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believe p is making a mistake, I don't believe p, I am making a mistake in failing
to believe p, If only I would believe p then I would know all truths, I am capable
of believing p, I have evidence in favor of p sufficient for knowledge, p seems
clearly and evidently true to me, etc. This does not seem to me to be a possible
situation. Another way of seeing this is to note that omniscience is not a property
that anyone who is not omniscient can get close to having. In this respect, it is like
the first infinite cardinal—there is no really large natural number that is close to
it. I do not think that appealing to an impossibility can refute a philosophical
thesis (unless it is a thesis about what is possible). An exception to a claim about
how things must be is a possible way that they could be otherwise—not a way
that could not be that is otherwise.47
My concern with responses such as Wierenga’s is that perhaps it amounts to more of a
fixation on the particular example rather than the general point Nagasawa is making.
Nagasawa’s objection raises an important question about the maximal excellence account
of worship-worthiness in particular but functions as an important question for worshipworthiness generally. It is a question already hinted at above: Is worship-worthiness a
bivalent property? That is, is worship-worthiness all-or-nothing—either a worshipworthy being is absolutely perfect or not worship-worthy at all?
The heart of Nagasawa’s objection seems to be that we can conceive of a being so
impressive as to land just one tier down on the scale of greatness from absolute perfection
and that this being may even be God. Suppose absolute perfection entails the coinstantiation of omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence. Suppose also that
absolute perfection turns out to be impossible. If God is the greatest possible being, and
the greatest possible being is a being who falls just short of absolute perfection, what
reason is there to believe worship would be an inappropriate attitude to take towards this
being? Nagasawa would say we have no more reason to believe that this being’s inability

47. Ed Wierenga, “Augustinian Perfect Being Theology and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2001): 149.
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to instantiate an impossible set of properties is a disparagement on the value of this being
than it would be a disparagement on the value of God’s power to say God cannot create
logical impossibilities such as square triangles. In this scenario, God is still supremely
valuable (in the sense that he actualizes the most possible value) even if he isn’t
absolutely perfect.
The sentiment behind the maximal excellence account includes claims such as
Brian Leftow’s: “arguably to see God as anything less than absolutely perfect would
make Him out not to deserve the sorts of attitudes Western monotheist worship
involves.”48 The justification for claims such as these usually goes something like this:
What deserves only qualified or limited praise thus does not deserve worship.
And anything that can have a superior can deserve only qualified or limited
praise. It is great—but there can be a greater, and so its praise ought to be
qualified accordingly. ‘O god, you are great—but there can be greater’: this does
not sound like worship.49
Murphy entertains the same thought: “It may well be that complete worship cannot be
given to a being conceived as less than perfect—how can one worship God as fully as
possible while thinking ‘but you could have been better’ or ‘there could have been a
being greater than you?’”50 The problem with this on Nagasawa’s view is that in the
scenario above there could not have been a greater. If absolute perfection is impossible, it
would not be the case that there could have been a better and thus the “there could have
been a better” line of reasoning fails as a justification for the maximal excellence
account.

48. Leftow, God and Necessity, 11.
49. Leftow, Ontological Argument, 93-94.
50. Murphy God’s Own Ethics, 3.
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This is not to say the maximal excellence account ultimately fails. On the
sufficient value inequality condition, it may be that the level of greatness necessary for
worship-worthiness just is absolute perfection. But for any being who falls short of
absolute perfection, the justified withholding of worship of this being would be in virtue
of its failing to have satisfied the sufficient value inequality condition, not because “there
could have been a better.” Accordingly, in a world where the maximal excellence account
of worship-worthiness is true and an absolutely perfect being is not possibly instantiated,
there simply would be no worship-worthy being. Even so, it remains unanswered why
absolute perfection is the requisite amount of greatness necessary for worship-worthiness.
It may well be the case in the end that worship-worthiness requires absolute
perfection. Perhaps there are other ways to get around objections of the type levied by
Nagasawa than to concede the multivalence of worship-worthiness—that is, to admit that
worship-worthiness is not an all-or-nothing property. I do not see how this could be done,
however, without the appeal to rather controversial metaphysical theses and thicker
concepts of God or certain kinds of defenses of perfect being theism than are often
commonly in circulation. Rather than making such a move, I will attempt to
accommodate objections to the maximal excellence account or worship-worthiness such
as Nagasawa’s by proceeding with my own account of worship-worthiness on their
terms—that is, on metaphysically deflationary grounds.
The Dual Threshold Account of Worship-Worthiness
The dual-threshold account of worship-worthiness I intend to defend shares most
in common with the maximal excellence account in that it grounds worship-worthiness in
the creature-independent value of any potential object of worship rather than the value-
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for-us creation and salvation-based accounts. The maximal excellence account posits a
single threshold for worship-worthiness—absolute perfection. However, in an attempt to
accommodate objections of the type levied by Nagasawa, for the sake of argument, I will
be positing a minimum threshold for worship-worthiness short of absolute perfection.
This means I will be proceeding on the assumption that worship-worthiness does not
require absolute perfection.
As noted above, I take worship to be fundamentally about the appropriate
response to a certain kind of value. For the sake of this project, it will be useful to assume
certain things about what kinds of attributes would make a being valuable. Atheists and
theists alike generally agree about what those traits are. Along these lines, I will not be
defending here that a great amount of power is a valuable attribute, contrary to what
certain schools like process theism might say or that great knowledge is valuable in the
way theists traditionally construe knowledge contrary to what open theists might say or
pragmatists about knowledge for knowledge’s sake. I shall take as axiomatic, then, that
the value of traits such knowledge, power, and goodness can be thought of as existing on
a kind of scale of value reaching to their intrinsic maxima—that is, omniscience,
omnipotence, and omnibenevolence represent the most valuable instance of each property
and certain beings possess varying combinations of knowledge, power, and goodness to
varying degrees.51

51. I am laying aside here, also, the complex issues surrounding the question of whether these
properties are predicated univocally, analogically, or equivocally of worship-worthy and non worshipworthy beings, or whether a being exhibiting these traits to the maximal degree could really properly be
considered an “instance” of anything.
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Worship-worthiness is a property that supervenes on the relation of two parties
massively unequal in value. Call this the sufficient value inequality condition. I take this
to be the key consideration for worship-worthiness. This consideration is made up of two
key components. First, as has been mentioned already, worship is never appropriately
reflexive. If worship presupposes a kind of elevation of the object and the minimization
of the subject, one can never appropriately worship oneself. Accordingly, this
supervenience entails necessarily the relation between two parties. Second, worshipworthiness entails necessarily an essential superiority of one being over the other.52 This
superiority, again, is about a certain kind of inevitable and all-consuming difference in
value such that it reduces the worshipper “to comparative nothingness.”53 The minimum
threshold requisite for worship-worthiness, then, is met when the sufficient value
inequality condition is satisfied.
This value is intrinsic to the object of worship rather than a kind of instrumental
value, that is, a value-for-us. The inequality between a given being and any given
worship-worthy being X must be so vast that for any X, it cannot be the case that value is
added to X should X act in certain ways that are beneficial to creatures as insignificant as
worshippers of X. This is because, counterfactually, if X had not acted in certain ways
beneficial to worshippers of X, X would be less valuable than if X had acted in those
ways. This would mean that creatures of relative insignificance or nothingness would

52. I am taking as a jumping off point Mark Murphy’s helpful section on worship-worthiness in
God’s Own Ethics. Here, Murphy briefly reflects on these two components as “key to circumscribing
appropriate worship-worthiness relations.” See 129-34.
53. Findlay, “Can God’s Existence be Disproved,” 51.
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have a real bearing on the value of beings of absurd magnitude. But this is contrary to
their value.54
It is a basic feature of worship-worthiness, then, that the worship-worthiness of a
being depends asymmetrically on the value of that being. This means that the value of a
being is more explanatorily basic that whatever other features this being might have.55
As I see it, there are two potential problems that arise from a formulation of a
minimum threshold of worship-worthiness where this threshold is not absolute
perfection. The first problem is that it seems Nagasawa’s objection could be repurposed
as an objection to the minimum threshold when the minimum threshold is an attempt to
accommodate Nagasawa’s objection in the first place.56 Let’s say that the minimum
threshold requisite for worship-worthiness with respect to rational creatures has a
determinate content made up of a specific configuration of knowledge, power, and
goodness. Would it not still be the case that a given being would go from not worshipworthy to worship-worthy with one uptick in value where the relative difference in value
between these beings appears to be too trivial to justify the evaluative difference?
Worship is elusive enough as a concept that it should come as no surprise that an
account of worship-worthiness might run up against issues with borderlines cases. We
may not be able to know whether a man becomes bald at 400 rather than 500 hairs. But

54. This is a common attitude in the major monotheisms. That a being of such great value as a
being like God would take any stock in the well-being of creatures is considered by the psalmist to be
marvelous: “When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars that you have
established; what are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them?” (Ps. 8:34 NRSV).
55. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 3
56. I am grateful to Mark Murphy for pointing this out to me.
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the vagueness problem for worship-worthiness is its relative borderline cases, meaning,
“the question is clear but our means for answering it are incomplete.” Absolute borderline
cases, on the other hand—cases where “there is incompleteness in the question itself” or
an intrinsic uncertainty—are not the issue here as they are in the case of whether cutting
off the head of a two-headed man counts as an instance of decapitating him.57 No amount
of conceptual analysis will answer this question for us without somewhat arbitrary
stipulations about the definition of decapitation. This is not so with worship-worthiness.
And as with other cases of vagueness in relative borderline cases, the problem is not with
the predicate itself but in our thinking about the predicate.
Wierenga’s reply to Nagasawa may be of more use here than in its original
context. Nagasawa’s “one trivial proposition” example appears to presume worshipworthiness moves at minute intervals. If this were the case, then worship-worthiness
borderline cases would be as seemingly impossible to resolve as the case of baldness. If it
were the case that baldness exclusively describes a subject when he reaches n number of
hairs then it would have to be true that at n + 1 hair this subject is no longer bald. But the
interval of a single hair seems far too small for this to be true. Worship-worthiness is a
very different kind of predicate than baldness. It may be the case that there is no regular
interval set on the scale of worship-worthiness. It may be the case that the intervals are
regular but incredibly far apart. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the value interval at
the minimum threshold is large enough to justify the evaluative difference between

57. Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018) ed.
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vagueness/>.
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worship-worthy and not worship-worthy.58 By my lights, this is sufficient to show the
relative plausibility of a hard threshold even if the vagueness as to where exactly the
actual threshold lands is left unresolved or is unresolvable.
The usefulness of a minimum threshold short of absolute perfection, even if we
must use “threshold” less strongly in the minimum case because of the vagueness of its
borderline cases, is that it creates some distance between these borderline issues and
instances of worship-worthiness closer to the maximum end of the spectrum than the
minimum. It is important to keep in mind here the goals of this project as a whole. What I
am after in the end is an explanation of worship-worthiness in the case of absolute
perfection. The issue of vagueness at the minimum level of worship-worthiness is no
more a problem for maximal worship-worthiness than borderline cases of baldness is a
problem for the legitimacy of predicating baldness of a man with zero hairs on his head.
The second potential issue that arises with a defense of a minimum threshold of
worship-worthiness short of absolute perfection is whether this introduces a flexibility
into the concept itself that amounts to a kind of indeterminism. If the key consideration
has to do with the value differential condition, then it appears that the minimum threshold
requisite for worship-worthiness might be variable (conceptually) on the kinds of
creatures that exist in the world. For example, is it a consequence of a defense of this sort
that there is a possible world where humans turned out to be worship-worthy beings? If
there existed beings sufficiently inferior to humans, it might be the case that these beings

58. This type of move would not work in the original context of Wierenga’s reply to Nagasawa
because even if the interval just before absolute perfection were large, we would still be talking about a
being of incredible greatness. But in the case of one downtick from the minimum threshold, we may be
talking about a being sufficiently inferior as to fail to be worship-worthy.
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could appropriately worship them. Additionally, if this follows, it would have the absurd
consequence of the possibility of human beings being worship-worthy in a world where
beings like God exist. In this case, both human beings and God are worship-worthy and
the minimum threshold appears to be stretched so thin in terms of its actual content as to
be meaningless.
This objection can be resolved relatively easily. Any worship-worthiness relation
necessarily presupposes a subject capable of forming the relevant beliefs, attitudes, and
desires constitutive of worship. But to be capable of forming these beliefs, attitudes, and
desires this subject must possess at the least an intellect and a will. It is hard to envision,
then, a being who both possesses an intellect and a will and is sufficiently inferior in
value to human beings as to satisfy the value differential condition. This rules out
inanimate objects, plants, non-rational animals, and a whole host of other kinds of
objects. What this means is that whatever the range of possible minimum thresholds, each
will fall within the same relatively narrow range of value insofar as 1) in all possible
worlds creatures such as humans generally hold the lowest position of value while still
having the capacities requisite for worship and 2) there is a ceiling on worship-worthiness
in the case of absolute perfection—that is, worship-worthiness has an intrinsic maximum.
So, it is not the case on my defense of the minimum threshold that there is a possible
world where both human beings and God are worship-worthy.59

59. The more difficult kinds of questions relevant to the flexibility of the minimum threshold are
questions such as, “Could God create a creature so impressive as to fail to satisfy the value inequality
condition—that is, are there possible beings so great that God would not be worthy of their worship?”
These are questions that will be addressed later in the next chapter and in the conclusion.
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The minimum threshold, then, is the minimum distance in value between the
subject and the object of worship requisite for worship-worthiness. This distance is of an
absurd magnitude such that the worshipper is reduced to comparative nothingness. I have
argued that this—the sufficient value inequality condition—is the key consideration for
getting our heads around worship-worthiness. Having argued for an account of worshipworthiness along these lines, we have set something of a base from which we can ascend
to supreme worship-worthiness.
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CHAPTER III
SUPREME WORSHIP-WORTHINESS
An important aim of the last chapter was to tease apart the concept of worshipworthiness from the concept of God to clarify what the concept might mean apart from its
association with the concept of God. In doing so, I am not necessarily committing myself
to the view that the concept of God and worship-worthiness are not mutually entailing. I
argued that the sufficient value inequality condition is the key consideration for getting
our heads around worship-worthiness. The minimum threshold of worship-worthiness is
met when the sufficient value inequality condition is satisfied. Making the case for the
minimum threshold of worship-worthiness required showing why it is problematic to take
worship-worthiness as a sufficient value criterion for perfect being theology.
Now we are in a position to move on to the task of the current chapter: to explore
what might make up the unique character of worship-worthiness in the supreme case—
that is, in the case of a being like God. To that end, over the course of this chapter, I will
identify and defend what I take to be two main features of an account of supreme
worship-worthiness: 1) the supremely worship-worthy being cannot fail to satisfy the
value inequality condition with respect to any being other than itself capable of forming
the relevant beliefs, attitudes, and desires constitutive of worship and 2) the supremely
worship-worthy being is worthy of an undivided worship.
I mentioned in the last chapter that I will be making certain assumptions about
what traits are valuable for a being to have. There are standard and nonstandard ways of
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conceiving of what traits are valuable and thus what traits an absolutely perfect being
would possess. For my purposes, I shall default to the standard way of conceiving of
absolute perfection. There are two things to note about the standard account of absolute
perfection functioning in my account of supreme worship-worthiness. First, I am working
with a relatively thin concept of absolute perfection so as to not kick any one off the team
from the get-go. Some would say that rather controversial attributes such simplicity (or
noncomposition) would be included in a being who is absolutely perfect.1 For the
moment, I will take absolute perfection to refer to a representative set of attributes as
something of a common denominator: omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence.
Second, absolute perfection in the standard sense entails an intrinsic maximum of value.
To say there is an intrinsic maximum to the value a being might exhibit is simply to say it
is not the case that the value of a being could increase indefinitely in the same way the set
of natural numbers increases indefinitely.2 However traits such as omniscience,
omnibenevolence, and omnipotence may be construed in their more technical definitions,
the intrinsic maxima of each means that it could not be the case that any one of these

1. I am also using the qualifier “absolute” in order to distinguish the working concept here from
revisionist accounts of perfection such as Nagasawa’s, where “perfect being” may refer to a set of attributes
that does not include the relevant omni attributes.
2. For instance, “what is essential in connection with divine might,” says George Schlesinger, “is
not its infinite magnitude nor its being equal to any task whatever, but that it exists in the sufficient amount
required for divine perfection. Thus if we should discover various tasks that seem to be beyond the scope of
His power, that is not necessarily any consequence as long as it is evident that the ability to perform the
tasks in question is not the kind of ability that enhances the greatness of the individual having it.” To put
the intrinsic maximum of omnipotence formally, then “X is omnipotent if it is logically impossible to
increase X’s power in consequence of which X might gain in excellence.” See George Schlesinger, “Divine
Perfection” Religious Studies 21 (1985): 147-58.

49

attributes be realized in a more valuable way. Conceptually, absolute perfection
represents the upper limit of value.
Necessary Worship-Worthiness
This last feature of the standard account of perfection I am working with bears a
relevant and parallel consequence for supreme worship-worthiness. If absolute perfection
is the upper limit of value, and worship-worthiness is a property that increases
proportionately with the value of a being to the intrinsic maximum of value, then
worship-worthiness too has an intrinsic maximum. Call this supreme worship-worthiness.
To be supremely worship-worthy means occupying the highest position on the scale of
worship-worthiness.
There are two ways to think about supreme worship-worthiness and its normative
status. Supreme worship-worthiness could be understood in a stronger normative sense or
a weaker descriptive sense. The weaker sense simply identifies absolute perfection as the
upper limit of worship-worthiness. It may be the case on the weaker notion that the
supremely worship-worthy being, as absolutely perfect, would be worthy of the worship
of any being such as humans but perhaps not the being who occupies the position of
value one downtick from absolute perfection.
The normative sense is a much more expansive concept. For example, Mark
Murphy’s definition of supreme worship-worthiness highlights the expansive nature of
the normative notion: “x has achieved this upper limit of worship-worthiness if
necessarily, if y is an agent (or an agent capable of forming the beliefs, attitudes, etc.
relevant to worship) and x ≠ y, then x is worthy of y’s worship.”3 The expansive nature

3. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130. There are a number of things that might follow from
this more expansive definition about what kinds of properties a being would need to have in order to
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of this way of putting it can be illustrated with a question such as this: Could there exist a
being so impressive so as to fail to satisfy the value inequality condition with respect to
the supremely worship-worthy being? Or consider again Nagasawa’s objection to the
maximal excellence account. On the value differential condition, could a being one
downtick in value from absolute perfection appropriately worship the supremely worshipworthy being? On the stronger normative notion, it must be the case that any being who
is not the supremely worship-worthy being, however impressive or absurdly valuable,
could appropriately worship the supremely worship-worthy being and so satisfy the value
inequality condition. Murphy’s sense of supreme worship-worthiness, then, presses
outward on the boundaries of value—or, as Murphy puts it in terms of the Anselmian
being’s perfection: “in characterizing the perfections of the Anselmian being, we should
conceive them as ‘pressing outward.’ That is, there is rational pressure towards
characterizing the Anselmian perfections in a substantively more expansive way.”4 In an
analogous way, there is rational pressure, on Murphy’s conception of supreme worshipworthiness, towards characterizing the value of the supremely worship-worthy being as
pressing outward against the upper limits of value so that for any being who is not the
supremely worship-worthy being capable of worshipping, to worship the supremely
worship-worthy being would be a fitting thing to do.

guarantee the requisite value gap between the supremely worship-worthy being and any other being such
that the supremely worship-worthy being would necessarily be worthy of their worship. For the purposes of
this project, I will be restricting my reflections to the two I have identified in the introduction until later in
the project when I reflect on the relevance of thicker concepts of God and thicker metaphysical
commitments for an account of worship-worthiness.
4. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 21.
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It might be that the weaker and stronger senses of supreme worship-worthiness
are not as far apart as I have indicated. Perhaps the first notion does have the expansive
power of the stronger notion built into it, but we simply are missing a step. We need a
reason to think that supreme worship-worthiness entails the necessary worshipworthiness of all other beings capable of forming the beliefs, desires, and attitudes
constitutive of worship. It seems to me the guiding intuition for an account of supreme
worship-worthiness is the notion that to be supremely worship-worthy means to be more
worship-worthy than any other potentially worship-worthy being. “Supreme” is a greaterthan relation. So, the supremely worship-worthy being, to be supreme, must possess the
attributes that make it more worship-worthy than any other worship-worthy being. Thus
the key consideration for an account of supreme worship-worthiness is to identify what
traits would make a being more worthy of worship than another.
This brings us to the first main feature of supreme worship-worthiness: the
supremely worship-worthy being cannot fail to satisfy the value inequality condition with
respect to any being other than itself capable of forming the relevant beliefs, attitudes,
and desires constitutive of worship. It seems apparent that to be worthy of any rational
agent’s worship is to be more worship-worthy than to be worthy of the worship of only a
limited range of worshippers. Here is one way to think about it. We can think of worshipworthiness admitting of varying degrees of stability or reliability. For any worshipworthy being just above the minimum threshold of worship-worthiness with respect to
creatures such humans (or whatever rational creature occupies the lowest status while still
possessing the requisite capacities for worship), we can imagine a host of changes to the
world in which they exist where they would lose their worship-worthy status with respect
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to some beings. Say a being just minimally qualifies as a worship-worthy being in a
world where Superman will be born. Suppose also that before Superman’s birth the only
other rational agents in this world are humans and this minimally worship-worthy being.5
On Superman’s birth, a being substantially more impressive than human beings has come
to exist and this minimally worship-worthy being loses its universal worship-worthy
status. As this example illustrates, beings who exist in the lowest register of worshipworthiness have a maximally fragile worship-worthiness status insofar as these beings are
the most susceptible to losing that status with respect to the largest range of kinds of
beings.6
To be supremely worship-worthy, on the other hand, is to have a maximally stable
worship-worthiness status. This maximally stable worship-worthiness status is another
way of putting the supremely worship-worthy being’s necessary worship-worthiness of
all rational agents capable of worshipping. For any being x who is not the supremely
worship-worthy being, even the most valuable being second to the supremely worshipworthy being, the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of x’s worship. There is no
change to any possible world that could result in the supremely worship-worthy being
losing its worship-worthiness status with respect to any beings with the requisite
capacities for worship.7

5. I realize this example is doing a terrible injustice to the cosmology of the DC universe.
6. This line of thinking is an adaptation of Jonathan Kvanvig’s articulation of God’s necessary
existence. See “Anselmian Adversities,” Religious Studies (2018): 4.
7. One (not insignificant) matter that has not been addressed up to this point is whether there could
be more than one perfect being and the possible problems this would create for any account of supreme
worship-worthiness. If there are two absolutely perfect beings and “supreme” is a greater-than relation, it
seems as though there would be no supremely worship-worthy being in a world with two absolutely perfect
beings. I am not convinced that there is a possible world where more than one absolutely perfect being
exists. Rather than dedicate space to rehearsing some of the standard ways of addressing this question in
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The objector might say that this reintroduces the problem of flexibility in the
concept of a minimum threshold verging on the kind of indeterminacy that was addressed
in the last chapter. If the supremely worship-worthy being is necessarily worship-worthy,
then this would mean that being would be worthy of the worship even of other worshipworthy beings. But for the supremely worship-worthy being to be worthy of the worship
of other worship-worthy beings, that being must satisfy the sufficient value inequality
condition with respect to these other worship-worthy beings. This would mean there is an
absurd difference in value between any other worship-worthy being and the supremely
worship-worthy being. The minimum threshold for worship-worthiness, then, would
stretch the absurd range of value from minimally worship-worthy beings to the supremely
worship-worthy being. So while the account I have been defending up to this point does
not allow for the possibility that creatures like humans and beings like God are worshipworthy, does it leave open a wide enough range of value as to lose its determinate
content?
There are two ways to think about the bearing on the range of value of existing
beings in a world where a supremely worship-worthy being exists. One would be that the
existence of beings who qualify as worship-worthy who are not the supremely worshipworthy being presses ever outward on the value of the supremely worship-worthy being.
The direction of conceptual influence, then, flows from non-supremely worship-worthy
worship-worthy beings towards the supremely worship-worthy being such that for any
worship-worthy being, the supremely-worship worthy being is always sufficiently more

perfect being theology, I will simply take for granted as a standard account of absolute perfection that there
can in principle only be one absolutely perfect being.

54

valuable so as to necessarily qualify as worthy even of their worship. The problem with
thinking of the bearing on the value of existing beings in a world where there is a
supremely worship-worthy being is that there is only so much space (so to speak) to
move upwards in value. Worship-worthiness has an intrinsic maximum; thus it cannot be
the case that the threshold of value requisite for supreme worship-worthiness can be
pressed ever outward without qualification—the pressure outward can only go so far.
The second way to think of this relation is that the existence of a supremely
worship-worthy being places a conceptual restraint on the range of the possible value of
other rational creatures. The direction of conceptual influence then, flows from the
supremely worship-worthy being downward such that the range of value of beings
possessing the requisite capacities for worship are significantly lower than had a
supremely worship-worthy being not existed. Putting things this way does not necessarily
undermine the validity of the minimum threshold as a real concept; it only means that if it
is possible for the supremely worship-worthy being to exist, it may be the case that there
are no other beings who would qualify as worship-worthy. In a world where there is no
supremely worship-worthy being, the minimum threshold is still a viable concept.8
Singleness of Object
This more expansive understanding of what it might mean to be the most
worship-worthy being on the scale of worship-worthiness, in addition to delivering
necessary worship-worthiness, brings us to the second principal feature of supreme

8. There could be a number of ways to go about guaranteeing the requisite value gap for necessary
worship-worthiness. Perhaps it is in virtue of a being like the supremely worship-worthy being being the
only being who is uncreated. Perhaps it is in virtue of a participation model of value where the supremely
worship-worthy being is the only being whose value is not derived from something other than itself.
Perhaps it is in virtue of the supremely worship-worthy being being the only noncomposite being.
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worship-worthiness: the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of an undivided
worship. The question here, as in the case of necessary worship-worthiness, is to ask
what properties would make a being worthier of worship than any other being. The
guiding intuition for singleness of object is that it is more worship-worthy to be the sole
worship-worthy being than to be a worship-worthy being among other worship-worthy
beings. The supremely worship-worthy being, then, would be required to possess this
feature. Call this the principle of undivided worship.
In this section, I will attempt to provide a somewhat modest explanation of the
principle of undivided worship. As a general note, one initially tempting but ultimately
inadvisable way to go about achieving the entailment from supreme worship-worthiness
to singleness of object is to characterize this principle in terms of creaturely limitation.
For example, one way to make good on the intuition that to be the only worship-worthy
being is to be more worship-worthy than to be a worship-worthy being among other
worship-worthy beings might be to appeal to the notion of competition. Beings of
incredible value may stand in competition with one another in some sense insofar as a
person is unable to worship more than one being at one time. But this fact of the limited
nature of a person’s intentional capacities says more about creaturely limitation than it
does the value of other beings. The finite capacities of a creature would not nullify the
incredible value and thus the worship-worthiness of another being.
Instead, a more promising way to go about getting the entailment would be to
work within the concept of worship itself. The general idea is that, perhaps if we can get
specific enough about what is happening when someone is worshipping, we can dial up a
specific feature of worship to the supreme level and achieve singleness of object. This
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approach suggests something of a direct relationship between the strength of the reasons
for worship and the worshipfulness of the actions called for. The greater the reasons for
worship, the stronger and more expansive the justifying force there is behind any given
worshipful action. The range of worshipful actions justified in worshipping the supremely
worship-worthy being is more inclusive than the range of worshipful actions justified in
worshipping some minimally worship-worthy being. Here is a rough analogy. The kinds
of acts performed with the intent to express love for another person should be
proportionate to the strength of the reasons one has to love that person. That a person is
related to us in a unique way would be such a reason. The kinds of actions one might
perform to express love for one’s child will be much more loving (thoughtful, sacrificial,
selfless) than the kinds of actions one might perform in expressing love for the child of an
acquaintance. Similarly, the stronger the reasons for worship or the more worship-worthy
a being is (the more knowledgeable, powerful, good—the more valuable the being) the
more worshipful (glorifying of the object, self-abasing) the actions justified in expressing
the beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions constitutive of worship.
The feature of worship that I will attempt to show can be used to get the
entailment is attention. Effectively, turning the worship-attention dial up to the maximum
looks like a singular and unbroken attention. By singular, I mean that the kind of
attention constitutive of an act of worship directed towards the supremely worshipworthy being at any one time ought to crowd out other objects as objects of worship. By
unbroken, I mean the supremely worship-worthy being would be worthy of the attention
constitutive of an act of worship at every opportunity where worshipping is a reasonable
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thing to do. These two components together, singular and continuous attention, are what
amount to singleness of object. I will defend these two components in turn.
There is a further clarification to make before getting to the two main components
of the principle of undivided worship. There are three possible ways that the principle of
undivided praise might be understood.
Strong: If one adequately worships the supremely worship-worthy being, one will
worship the supremely worship-worthy being exclusively.
Stronger: The existence of the supremely worship-worthy being amounts to a
requiring reason not to worship other beings.
Strongest: The existence of a supremely worship-worthy being places a
metaphysical constraint on the value of other creatures such that its existence
excludes the possibility that other worship-worthy beings exist.
Because I have decided to restrict my reflections to justifying rather than requiring
reasons for worship and to forgo what I think to be the relevant metaphysical and
theological commitments that would be needed to make the strongest case, I will restrict
my reflections to a defense of the strong formulation of the principle of undivided
worship. Along these lines, by “adequately worships” I mean, loosely, if one adequately
worships the supremely worship-worthy being, one will 1) worship in a way that
meaningfully corresponds to what the supremely worship-worthy being’s greatness
would merit for that being and 2) is in accord with their capacities.
Singular Attention
An early reflection on the nature of attention comes from William James:
Attention “is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization,
concentration, of consciousness are of its essence.”9 Since James, many others have

9. William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (Boston: Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 403.
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reflected on the nature of attention in psychology, neuro and behavioral science,
phenomenology, and philosophy of mind. As a result, there are a number of ways
attention has been conceptualized. Wayne Wu notes four in particular:
•
•
•
•

Attention as a filter of information for further processing
Attention as binding features for object representation and awareness
Attention as spotlight (perhaps zoom-lens), highlighting its target
Attention as selecting targets for memory consciousness, or action10

Wu himself defends an account of attention as “the subject’s selecting an item for the
purpose of guiding action”11 Sebastian Watzl argues for a structural account of attention
where “the contents of conscious experience can be represented in a space defined by
relations of relative salience. Attention to an item structures one’s conscious experience
around that item.”12 Each of these have in common the basic notion identified by James:
“Attention is involved in the selective directedness of our mental lives.”13
I do not plan to devote space to analyzing the concept beyond this basic notion.
For the purposes of this project, I will take this notion of the selectivity of attention as
basic to any account of attention. With the exception of addressing issues relevant to an
account of attention as they arise in my defense of the principle of undivided worship, the
“selective directedness of our mental lives” will be sufficient as a working concept of
attention to get the discussion off the ground.

10. Wayne Wu, Attention (New York: Routledge, 2014), 5.
11. Wu, Attention, 6.
12. Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, and Wayne Wu, “Introduction,” in Attention:
Philosophical and Psychological Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xv; Sebastian Watzl
“Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness” in Attention: Philosophical and Psychological
Essays.
13. Christopher Mole, “Attention,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017) edited by
Edward N. Zalta URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/attention/>.
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Accordingly, we can turn now to an explanation and defense of the first
component of the principle of undivided worship: singular attention. There is
disagreement in the literature on attention as to whether attention is something that can be
divided—that is, if there is such a thing as partial attention or whether attention admits of
degrees. The alternative is that attention is a kind of cognitive unison.14 On the notion of
attention as cognitive unison, distraction would amount to something like the shifting of
attention between multiple targets. I do not think that my defense of singular attention in
the case of supreme worship-worthiness hangs on either one of these options.
Here is a defense of singular attention in the case of supreme worship-worthiness
under the assumption that attention can be partial. There is something intuitionally
compelling about the idea of attention admitting of degrees. We commonly speak as
though we give more attention to matters that are of more consequence or significance or
value than matters of relative insignificance. It would sound somewhat odd to say that a
brain surgeon devotes the same amount of attention to his drive to work as he does when
performing brain surgery. A high profile spy may find herself out to dinner with an
unsuspecting partner whom she devotes just enough attention to so as not to give away
that the real reason she is there is to listen to the conversation of the two men sitting
directly behind her where the majority of her attention is directed.
Accordingly, if we were to isolate a single act of worship at a particular moment
in time, the attention directed to the object of worship would exist somewhere on the
scale from minimal attention to maximal attention. But if the amount of attention that we

14. Wu, Attention, 99-103; Christopher Mole, Attention Is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in
Philosophical Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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give to an object tends to reflect the value or relative significance of that object, then it
makes sense to say that the degree of attention a worship-worthy being would be worthy
of increases proportionately with that being’s worship-worthiness.
Along these lines, the kind of selective directedness of our mental lives involved
in an act of worship—carrying with it the cognitive and volitional content constitutive of
worship15—can be more or less pure or unified. In the case of a minimally worshipworthy being, it would not necessarily be unfitting if our attention was split between this
worship-worthy being and something else—even another worship-worthy being. It may
even be inappropriate to give our absolute or unified attention to a minimally worshipworthy being. It would be inappropriate to give the amount of attention to a baseball
game that the birth of one’s child would merit and vice versa. The birth of one’s child
would be worthy of an absolute attention while a baseball game would not.
The supremely worship-worthy being, however, would be worthy of our singular
attention in any one act of worship. The kind of attention constitutive of an act of worship
directed towards the supremely worship-worthy being at any one time ought to crowd out
other objects as objects of worship. I use emphasis here to indicate that I do not mean
singular attention in the sense that any act of worship of the supremely worship-worthy
being ought to crowd out any other object from the perceptual field or awareness of the
subject. For example, in Christian worship, a person may kneel before the consecrated
host with her attention directed singularly toward the host. But this does not mean that the
worshipper does not also see the altar, hear the deacon, smell the incense, and have some

15. To direct our attention in worship to a worship-worthy being would be in some sense to call to
mind the reasons for worship—whether beliefs or attitudes.
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level of awareness of these objects. Rather, the attention at this particular moment in time
is of a kind that eliminates all other objects as potential objects of worship.
But what if it is not possible, as some theorists of attention think, for attention to
be divided? The notion of attention as cognitive unison is a form of the selection for
action account of attention. Christopher Mole states it formally:
Let α be an agent, let τ be some task that the agent is performing, and call the set
of cognitive resources that α can, with understanding, bring to bear in the service
of τ, τ’s “background set.”
α’s performance of τ displays cognitive unison if and only if the resources in τ’s
background set are not occupied with activity that does not serve τ.16
The basic idea is that to attend to something is to dedicate every relevant cognitive
function to guiding some action; or at least, if a function is not involved in the guiding of
a task, it is not involved in the aiding of some other task. Distraction, on this account,
would be characterized as the shifting of attention between targets rather than attention
being split between multiple targets.
Consequently, we need only to make a minor adjustment to the defense of
singular attention offered above. On this account of attention, the singular attention
merited by the supremely worship-worthy being would be for a cognitive unison to be
sustained over the period of a single worship event. Rather than grounding this claim in
the notion that we tend to devote more attention to matters of more significance (as
“more” implies that attention can be partial), we can think of sustained attention over any
period of time as something that requires more or less energy to sustain. The amount of
energy we allocate to remaining undistracted during a movie is likely less than the
amount we allocate to remaining undistracted during an important exam. Thus we can

16. Christopher Mole, Attention is Cognitive Unison, 64.
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think of the energy we devote to sustaining our attention on any one target of worship as
existing on a scale where minimally worship-worthy beings are worthy of less energy
dedicated to sustaining attention during worship than the supremely worship-worthy
being. The supremely worship-worthy being, then, would be worthy of a sustained
attention minimally susceptible to being broken. This explicitly eliminates all other
objects as potential objects of worship over any one episode. Perhaps it would be
appropriate to shift our attention as we offer sacrifices to Jupiter and then to Juno in one
cultic event, but this would not be the case for the supremely worship-worthy being.
Continuous Attention
Suppose the singular attention criterion succeeds; is this sufficient to deliver
undivided worship? Even if the supremely worship-worthy being were worthy of an
undivided attention over the course of any one worship event, the episodic nature of
worship complicates the case for undivided worship. Generally, a person worships for a
period and then is done worshipping. What might it mean, then, to say that the supremely
worship-worthy being would be worthy of a singular attention unbroken over time—that
is, over the lifetime of a worshiper?
One way to understand the element of continuous worship would be to expand the
kinds of actions that could be considered acts of worship beyond the typical ones such
that each one of our actions is a candidate for an act of worship. Thinking of it this way
would characterize the supremely worship-worthy being as worthy of our every action
being an act of worship in a more or less direct sense.
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How might this be the case? Consider the possibilities of superimposition or
supervenience. Ninian Smart reflects on the relevance of the concept of superimposition
for any account of worship:
For even though sweeping a room may count as a form of worship, this is only
seriously so when the person sweeping the room intends his action not merely as
sweeping but also as worshipping. For him to intend this, he has to employ the
concept of worshipping and more particularly of worshipping, say, God - and
these concepts he basically learns elsewhere.17
Perhaps there is something about the nature of intention in action that introduces a helpful
flexibility into the concept of worship. Insofar as it is possible for any one of our
(nonsinful) actions to also be an act of worship, then every one of our actions is eligible
as an act of worship. For the supremely worship-worthy being to be worthy of a
continuous or unbroken worship-attention, then, would mean the supremely worshipworthy being would be worthy of our every action to be an act of worship in some direct
or indirect way. A life lived in this way would amount to a singular act of worship or a
succession of acts of worship one after the other.
It is not clear whether any of the available concepts of attention can deliver on
any one of our actions being eligible as acts of worship. Attention is a relatively new
topic of serious philosophical and scientific interest, and I do not wish to hang the success
of this project on what would amount to a controversial position on what attention is. For
instance, understanding continuous attention in the way above would require committing
myself to some view of attention where attention can be partial. If the cognitive unison
account of attention is true, the above defense must be false because it would not allow
that attention to be directed to the supremely worship-worthy being if all other relevant

17. Smart, The Concept of Worship, 5.
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cognitive faculties are not aiding the task of worship. Even an account of attention that
permits degrees presents difficulties. It is difficult to imagine that someone whose
concentration is devoted to a task as mentally taxing as defusing a live bomb or
presenting an argument in court in defense of a man believed to be innocent could in any
meaningful sense have some degree of attention reserved for the supremely worshipworthy being—much less whatever degree of attention would be requisite for worship.
Arguably, in worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being, the supremely worshipworthy being ought to at least be the primary object of our attention even if not the sole
object. So perhaps it is impossible to achieve undivided worship in the way above on
phenomenological or practical grounds.
Thinking of worship in this way is not entirely foreign to the Christian tradition,
however. Saint Augustine says in The City of God that “The true sacrifice, then, is every
act done in order that we might cling to God in holy fellowship, that is, every act which is
referred to the final good in which we can be truly blessed.”18 “But sacrifice,” says
Aquinas commenting on Augustine, “belongs to religion…. Every virtuous deed is said to
be a sacrifice, insofar as it is done out of reverence of God” and “Every deed, insofar as it
is done in God’s honor, belongs to religion.”19 Thus the question is, as in the case of
whether worship is an obedience-entailing concept—in what consists the phrases “done
out of reverence of God” or “done in God’s honor.” A defense of the principle of
undivided worship along the lines of the one above might be salvageable on systematic

18. Augustine, The City of God, vol. 1 trans. William Babcock (New York: New City Press,
2012), 310.
19. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 81, a. 4.
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theological grounds. To achieve the principle of undivided worship one the grounds
above, our concept of worship would need to include some fundamental dispositional
element such that worship would include any act involved in the general ordering of
one’s life to the supremely worship-worthy being. Saint Paul seems to be getting at
something along these lines: “I appeal to you therefore, brother and sisters, by the
mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God,
which is your spiritual worship.”20 Paul seems to think that the whole of one’s life can be
lived in such a way as to be an act of worship. Perhaps this dispositional element could
ground the notion that any one of our acts are candidates for acts of worship insofar as
they are “done out of reverence of God,” even if the supremely worship-worthy being is
not the primary object of our attention in some mentally taxing act. It is not within the
scope of this project to tease out how this might be the case philosophically. As far as the
parameters of this project are concerned, I consider this problem to be in the same boat as
the obedience-entailing or nonobedience-entailing problem in the concept of worship. It
is a second order issue in worship-worthiness.21
Consider another way of understanding the continuous element of undivided
worship. Continuous attention could also refer to performing an act of worship at any
moment where worshiping is a possible or reasonable thing to do. “Continuous” or
“unbroken” in this sense is continuous in the way perfect attendance or an on-base
percentage can be continuous or unbroken. Perfect school attendance does not mean that
a student never leaves the school. Neither does 1000% on base percentage mean that a

20. Rom. 12:1.
21. There will be occasion to reflect on this issue in the conclusion.
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player never steps foot off the bag. Rather, the continuous or unbroken character of
perfect attendance or a 1000% on-base percentage refers to the reality that in every
instance where there is an opportunity to attend school or to reach base, a student or
player succeeds in attending school or reaching base.
In the case of an example more proximate to worship, a man may love his spouse
maximally insofar as he expresses his love for his spouse at every opportunity (“every
opportunity” reasonably construed) to express his love. It would not be the case that
every one of his actions could count as an expression of love for his spouse, but this does
not count against his love any more than a baseball player’s going out to dinner would
count against his OBP or a student’s not attending school during summer break counts
against her perfect attendance. Importantly, “at every opportunity” includes a vast range
of kinds of actions at varying degrees of sacrifice. Expressing his love at every
opportunity may mean cooking dinner when his spouse is tired. It would include resisting
the temptation to perform some act that would count against his love such as romantically
engaging some person other than his spouse. Adequately expressing his maximal love
may also mean laying down his life when his spouse’s life is threatened.
Similarly, undivided worship would include a singular attention over any one act
of worship and an unbroken attention where “unbroken” refers to a singular attention at
every opportunity (reasonably construed) to worship. The qualifier “reasonably
construed” merits comment. I take “reasonably construed” to mean that “every
opportunity” to worship is qualified by what other legitimate reasons one has not to
worship in any given moment. Along these lines, what would count as an adequate
expression of worship of the supremely worship-worthy being would vary from person to
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person. A single mother of five working multiple jobs to put food on the table is not
failing to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being if the only opportunity
she has to worship where worshipping would not occur at the expense of fulfilling her
obligations to her children is once a week on Sunday mornings.22 If a person is seriously
ill or impaired in such a way that there are significantly fewer opportunities for that
person to worship than one who is well, they are not failing to adequately worship the
supremely worship-worthy being if the disparity between the number of opportunities to
worship for one who is well and one who is not can be accounted for by the impairment.
A defense of the sort I have offered above is flexible enough to cover the case of the
single mother as well as the monk who has dedicated his life to prayer and worship.
“Every opportunity” for the cloistered monk would amount to significantly more
opportunities than for the single mother.
As in the case of the man who wishes to adequately express his maximal love for
his spouse where doing so includes expressing his love at every opportunity to express
his love, there are a multitude of kinds of expressions at varying levels of sacrifice that
may take place in worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being at every opportunity
to worship. Suppose one has an additional fifteen minutes at the start of the day before
leaving the house for work than originally planned. Instead of spending these fifteen
minutes scrolling through social media, this person takes this time as an opportunity to
worship the supremely worship-worthy being in some way. Giving up fifteen minutes of

22. It is worth noting here again that, on systematic theological grounds, it may even be the case
that this mother’s actions in caring for her children are acts of worship. The difficulty is in determining how
one can refer to God (as an act of worship must) in acting in certain ways towards persons. The Gospel of
Matthew points us in a possible direction: “And the king will answer them, ‘Truly I tell you, just as you did
it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me.’” (25:40).
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social media time does not amount to all that much of a sacrifice or reflect a great
intensity of expression.23 One could imagine more costly examples.
More to the point of this section, to adequately worship the supremely worshipworthy being would include organizing one’s life in a way where there are maximal
opportunities to worship (reasonably construed) and a requirement not to worship another
being. Any opportunity to worship a being is an opportunity to worship the supremely
worship-worthy being. But for any opportunity to worship the supremely worship-worthy
being, the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of worship at that particular
moment. So to worship another being would be to fail to worship the supremely worshipworthy being at an opportunity to worship the supremely worship-worthy being. Insofar
as the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of worship at every opportunity to
worship, worshipping another being would count as a mark against adequately
worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being.
It is important to keep in mind the contingency of the strong formulation of the
principle of undivided worship. When I say that adequately worshiping the supremely
worship-worthy being would include a requirement not to worship another being, what I
am not saying is that this amounts to an all-things-considered type of obligation. It is only
a requirement in the sense of its entailment in the notion of adequately worshipping the
supremely worship-worthy being. To establish an all-things-considered sort of obligation
not to worship another being, one would need to show why there might be an all-things-

23. I am not suggesting here that to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being one
must spend every moment of free time worshipping. The reasonable construal of “every opportunity”
would account for the importance of leisure, rest, socializing, and vocation. As with most things of
importance, the appropriate balance requires wisdom and discernment.
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considered sort of obligation to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being.
I have restricted my defense and explanation to the strong formulation and thus
consciously avoided the language of obligation or requiring reasons.
Conclusion
There are a great number of things that could be said to be unique about worshipworthiness in the supreme case. For instance, adequately worshiping the supremely
worship-worthy being might include a requirement against a range of kinds of actions or
attitudes that would count against adequate worship. Insofar as one is prideful, one is
failing in some moment to acknowledge the importance or value of one’s own life
relative to the supremely worship-worthy being. Adequately worshiping the supremely
worship-worthy being, then, might entail a requirement against pridefulness.
The purpose of this chapter, however, was to provide an explanation and defense
of what I take to be two principal features of supreme worship-worthiness: necessary
worship-worthiness and the principle of undivided worship. The guiding intuition in
discerning these two features is the notion that to be supremely worship-worthy is to be
that being than which there is not a more worship-worthy on the scale of worshipworthiness. The supremely worship-worthy being would have those properties requisite
to satisfy this description. First, to be worthy of worship of any rational being with the
necessary capacities is to be more worship-worthy than to be worthy of only some
portion of those beings. Accordingly, to be necessarily worship-worthy is a key feature of
supreme worship-worthiness. The intuition behind the principle of undivided worship is
that to be the sole worship-worthy being is to be more worship-worthy than to be a
worship-worthy being among other worship-worthy beings. To cash out this intuition, I
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proceeded in a somewhat circuitous fashion. I isolated the concept of attention as a key
feature of the concept of worship, showing that the supremely worship-worthy being
would be worthy of singular and a continuous worship-attention where “singular” and
“continuous” deliver on the notion of the supremely worship-worthy being as worthy of
an undivided worship.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The principal aim of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between
worship-worthiness and absolute perfection. I have argued that absolute perfection
occupies a unique position within the concept of worship-worthiness. To be absolutely
perfect is to be supremely worship-worthy. To attain supreme worship-worthiness is to
pass a threshold that makes it qualitatively different from any other instance of worshipworthiness both in that to be supremely worship-worthy is to be necessarily worthy of
worship and to be the one being to qualify for undivided worship.
To accomplish this, in the second chapter I argued for what I consider the key
consideration for worship-worthiness: to be worthy of worship by some agent is to have
satisfied the sufficient value inequality condition. This criterion states that to be worthy
of worship is to be absurdly greater in value than a would-be worshipper. Along these
lines, I attempted to tease apart the concept of worship-worthiness from the concept of
God in order to become clearer about what the concept means independently of its
association with God. Teasing apart worship-worthiness from the concept of God yielded
a multivalent concept of worship-worthiness—that is, I argued for a notion of worshipworthiness that is not an all-or-nothing property. On this account, it is possible to be
worthy of worship without being absolutely perfect.
In the third chapter I used the multivalence of worship-worthiness to reach
supreme worship-worthiness and show what is unique about this particular instance. I
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argued that supreme worship-worthiness entails a maximally stable worship-worthiness
status and thus necessary worship-worthiness. There is no possible world where the
supremely worship-worthy being is not worship-worthy of any rational agent with the
requisite capacities for worship. I also argued that to be supremely worship-worthy is to
be uniquely worship-worthy insofar as the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of
an undivided worship. In particular, I advanced the strong version of the principle of
undivided worship where this principle means that to adequately worship the supremely
worship-worthy being is to worship the supremely worship-worthy being singularly and
continuously.
There are a number of ways this project might naturally be continued into further
reflection. I have already mentioned the importance of the obedience-entailing or
nonobedience-entailing issue in the concept of worship as a second order issue in
worship-worthiness. Along these lines, there is much work to be done on the relationship
between worship-worthiness and divine authority. Mark Murphy has helpfully laid out
the relevant considerations in a chapter titled “Worship-Worthiness and AllegianceWorthiness” in God’s Own Ethics.1 His work here and in his monograph on divine
authority merit further engagement on this front. Adjacent areas of interest might be to
pursue the relationship between worship and neighboring concepts such as devotion,
gratitude, and love.
Another potentially fruitful area to pursue with respect to the work done in this
project would be to explore what relevance the concept of worship-worthiness does, in
fact, have for the concept of God and vice versa. I have consciously attempted to treat the

1. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 129-46.
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issue of developing an account of worship-worthiness as separate from method in perfect
being theology. At the least, we ought to have a functioning concept of worshipworthiness formed independently from operative assumptions about what God must be
like. Otherwise, it is difficult to see in what way it is useful in this respect. I have noted
the ways that I find inadvisable when it comes to using worship-worthiness to yield
results for the concept of God. But I think it would go too far to say that the concept of
worship-worthiness has zero bearing on how we go about thinking about our concept of
God.
For instance, I have noted that Nagasawa’s monograph, Maximal God: A New
Defense of Perfect Being Theism, was a primary inspiration for this thesis. The core of
the perfect being thesis, according to Nagasawa, is that God is the greatest possible being.
And while “greatest possible being” may refer to the being who instantiates the set of
omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence, it may be the case that these properties
cannot possibly be co-instantiated because of any number of classical problems in perfect
being theology (the problem of evil, incoherence of an attribute). If this turned out to be
the case, we should simply revise our concept of God to accommodate the issue. Should
we find the problem of evil insurmountable, for example, perhaps we should conclude—
rather than that God does not exist—that “the greatest possible being” would not include
omnipotence. The greatest possible being, then, would not be the absolutely perfect
being.
There is a level of indeterminacy to this concept of God insofar as it is
indefinitely revisable. Should we encounter a roadblock that appears we cannot find our
way around, we should drop God’s greatness a tier rather than give up on the enterprise
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of perfect being theology. But this seems to leave open the content of the divine identity.
God might be omnipotent, for example. But on Nagasawa’s account, God could fall far
short of omnipotence.
Because the identity of the object of worship is the key consideration constitutive
of the worship-worthiness judgment, this indeterminacy creates a number of substantial
problems.2 This implicit agnosticism about what God is actually like creates issues both
for successful reference and introduces an instability to the worship-worthiness judgment.
If our concept of God is indefinitely revisable, so too is the basis of our worshipworthiness judgments. The content of the divine identity ought to be stable enough for us
such that we do not run the risk of having committed idolatry or performed unfitting
worship acts in revising our understanding of God’s identify from one set of properties to
another. There is no mechanism in place to ensure we do not moderate our concept of
God too soon. How, under Nagasawa’s method, are we to know when to press further in
our investigation to resolve a given issue and when to moderate? In the former case, we
would have found the solution and continued to direct our worship to the actual God.
Second, Nagasawa notes the concern traditional perfect being theists might have
with his account in that it is possible for maximal God to turn out less worship-worthy
than omni God or, on the maximal excellence account, not worship-worthy at all: “Few
perfect being theists would be willing to accept the maximal God approach if it can entail

2. For instance, Peter Geach argues about love of God: “But cannot love unite a man to God
despite any amount of intellectual error? I do not think so…. A man’s love for a woman, however much it
means to him, scarcely latches on to her if his acquaintance with her is extremely slight, if she is for him a
princesse lointaine, if he has fantastic misconceptions of her actual characteristics.” See Peter Geach, God
and the Soul (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1969), 111.
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that God is not worshipworthy.”3 I have shown that Nagasawa’s response to this (the one
trivial proposition objection) is not all that problematic on the account of worshipworthiness defended in this thesis. We can concede the multivalence of worshipworthiness and potentially still make trouble for Nagasawa’s defense of perfect being
theism with the worship-worthiness problem insofar as to be absolutely perfect is to be
exceedingly more worship-worthy than any other worship-worthy being.
Would this mean, however, that worship-worthiness can in fact be used as a
criterion in perfect being theology? Jeff Speaks suggests as much. For Speaks, “the claim
that God is the greatest possible being does not capture the core of our conception of
God. At best, it can capture the core of our conception of God only if it is combined with
certain theses about modal space.”4 As Nagasawa’s approach illustrates, “the greatest
possible being” does not guarantee that God is sufficiently great to be God unless it is
partnered with certain assumptions about what it is possible to be.
One way to show that this is a mistake is to imagine that, at the end of the
universe, it turns out that Michael Jordan was the most impressive being to have
ever existed. Then atheism is true, because, as it turns out, the universe did not
turn out to include any being great enough to be God. Being the best would not
make Jordan God; so the claim that God is the greatest actual being does not
capture the core of our conception of God.5
Convinced that the perfect being thesis and the existence proofs of natural theology
ultimately fail to deliver divine attributes, Speaks suggests a number of possible ways
forward:

3. Nagasawa, Maximal God, 105
4. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 121.
5. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 122-23.
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It is then hard to see how we can get started theorizing about the attributes of God
without bringing to bear substantial assumptions about God which are themselves
neither conceptual truths nor knowable by reason alone. It seems inevitable then
that our reasoning about the attributes of God will be somewhat parochial, in the
sense that it will be guided by theses about God which not all believers in God
will be willing to endorse….
For instance, one might take as one’s foundational attribute the property of being
capable of offering human beings genuine salvation; or the property of being a
suitable object of faith; or the property of being deserving of worship. (Though
we should not pretend that the claims that God has these properties are conceptual
truths.) Of course, properties like these do already play a role in theorizing about
the attributes in contemporary philosophy of religion. But a philosophical
theology which put properties like these, rather than the property of being the
greatest possible being, at the center would look quite a bit different.6
It seems to me then, that, if Speaks is right about the insufficiency of the perfect being
thesis in its classical formulations to deliver a guarantee of sufficient greatness (and I do
not know that he is), it is an open question as to the usefulness of the concept of worshipworthiness as a criterion in philosophical theology. In developing the account of worshipworthiness, I have conceded the possibility that there is no worship-worthiness that is not
necessary worship-worthiness and thus no worship-worthy being who is not absolutely
perfect. If this account of worship-worthiness could be formed independently of operative
assumptions about what God must be like, perhaps there is a usefulness as a criterion so
long as God’s own nature is not characterized relationally in a metaphysical sense.
Importantly, it appears to me also, as Speaks suggests, that the extent to which we can
investigate worship and worship-worthiness with philosophical rigor is an open question.
Independent of other confessional commitments, it may be that we max out philosophical

6. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 156-57. Jerome Gellman suggests a similar
procedure—a procedure that will deliver a “religiously adequate” conception of God. For Gellman, a
religiously adequate conception of God would be one where God is that being for whom it would be most
appropriate to love “with a love than which there can be no greater.” Jerome Gellman, “God: A Perfectly
Good Being,” (forthcoming). This criterion, argues Gellman, would deliver all the other religiously salient
attributes of God even if it does not yield perfection simpliciter.
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insight into this notion sooner than we might hope in terms of its relationship to the
formation of our concept of God. I am not certain one way or the other.
Another natural extension of this project would be to explore the implications of a
justifying reasons account of worship-worthiness for the requiring reasons case. Saint
Anselm argues in the conclusion of the Monologion:
It is to the supreme essence alone that we properly give the name God…. This is
the kind of substance that is so pre-eminently valuable that people have to
worship it: the kind of substance that one ought to pray to for help against the
forces that threaten. And what is so valuable as to be worshipped, what is to be
prayed to—for anything—so much as the supremely good and supremely
powerful spirit that dominates and regulates all things.7
But what might it mean to owe God worship? One would need to have decisive
reasons to worship God where failing to act on these decisive reasons would be
unreasonable or impermissible. Would the requiring reasons case need additional reasons
beyond what I have argued are justifying reasons? Or are the justifying reasons identical
to the requiring reasons, as Anselm seems to indicate here? That is, is God’s absolute
perfection, his being “pre-eminently valuable,” sufficient to ground a requirement to
worship? What about a strong requirement to not worship any being other than God? I
have argued that to worship the supremely worship-worthy being adequately, or, in a way
that meaningfully corresponds to his greatness, would be to worship the supremely
worship-worthy being alone. But what might be decisive reasons to adequately worship
the supremely worship-worthy being? More work needs to be done here at the

7. Anselm, Monologion, 80.
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intersections of value theory and philosophical theology/analytic theology as the subject
is ripe for fruitful conversation.8
The final area of further engagement I will note is the relevance of thicker
metaphysical commitments or concepts of God for an account of worship-worthiness.
Throughout, I have not appealed to attributes such as simplicity or participation models
of value to advance my case. But if simplicity is a possible attribute or participatory
metaphysics a coherent model for understanding value, they are immanently relevant to
an account of worship-worthiness.
For instance, being the only noncomposite being might be one way that the
supremely worship-worthy being could have a maximally stable worship-worthiness
status (necessary worship-worthiness). In the case of simplicity, the value gap is as wide
as it could possibly be in that it is in principle not traversable. In forgoing the
metaphysical commitments that would be required to make this case, I have allowed the
supremely worship-worthy being to be, in some sense, in competition with other beings
where each being exists on a single scale of value. But there is a qualitative difference
between a simple being whose value is “through itself,” as Anselm would say, or
underived, and a being who has a certain value in virtue of a being other than himself or
through something else. Thus divine simplicity and a participation model of value might
be one way to guarantee the requisite value gap for necessary worship-worthiness.9

8. Murphy has suggested that the question of worship-worthiness and the obligation to worship are
as different as the question of whether a joke is funny and whether one should laugh at it. Others have
offered similar analogies. For instance, Bayne and Nagasawa note that “someone could refuse to admire
Michelangelo’s David despite acknowledging that the David is the sort of thing that it is reasonable to
admire.” Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 129; Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 303. I am
doubtful as to the aptness of these analogies.
9. Note how, in this case, it seems that Nagasawa’s one trivial proposition objection does not even
get off the ground. If simplicity is an attribute of an absolutely perfect being, there is no such thing as a
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What is more, in the case of a simple being, we may have a grounding for the
strongest version of the principle of undivided worship where the existence of a simple
being places a metaphysical constraint on the range of value that might be exhibited by
other beings. If a simple being existed, it most likely would be the case that the only
being deserving of worship would be the supremely worship-worthy being insofar as in a
world where a simple being exists, the simple being would be the only being to exhibit an
underived value. It would not be the case then, that there might exist some being so
impressive as to fail to satisfy the sufficient value inequality condition with respect to the
supremely worship-worthy being because any being that would exist other than the
supremely worship-worthy being would be on the created side of the uncreated/created
distinction.10

nearly perfect being. Any being other than the supremely worship-worthy being would be valuable in virtue
of its “borrowing” value from the supremely worship-worthy being.
10. Additionally, there may be a way to ground the more expansive and inclusive notion of
worship in the notion that God is goodness itself. On the classical notion, our wills are oriented towards the
good. It may be on this notion that every one of our actions are candidates for acts of worship insofar as we
perform these actions in virtue of our disposition towards the good, or “out of reverence for God.”
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